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INTRODUCTION
Montana lacks any meaningful or enforceable conflict of 
interest statute controlling elected officials and public 
sector employees. The press serves as the only de facto 
interpreter of questions and enforcer of ethics violations. 
A few recent newspaper articles illustrate this point. During 
the summer of 1992 the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
(FWP) and State Representative Ed Grady negotiated a hunting 
easement on property owned by Representative Grady.^ In the 
fall of 1992 after State Representative Dorothy Bradley's 
gubernatorial defeat, she and her running mate State Senator 
Mike Halligan accepted a free train ride from the Burlington 
Northern Railroad on one of their specially equipped railroad 
cars. Following the same election, supporters of Public 
Service Commissioner-elect Bob Rowe organized a fundraiser to 
retire his campaign debt by inviting representatives of PSC- 
regulated utilities. During the 1993 legislative session, 
immediately following his tenure as director of the Department 
of Health and Environmental Sciences (DHES), Dennis Iverson 
(an ex-legislator) worked as a lobbyist for a cement company
^Representative Ed Grady has been negotiating with the 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to enter into a 
conservation agreement for the preservation of wildlife 
located on his ranch. This agreement would pay Rep. Grady 
over $300,000 during a five year period to permit hunting 
access on his ranch (an activity he already permits). 
Questions have arisen as to the propriety of this agreement in 
light of the fact that Rep. Grady serves on both the Fish and 
Game, and appropriations subcommittee that oversees the budget for FWP.
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seeking to defeat legislation that would control the burning 
of hazardous waste at cement plants. In April 1993 PSC 
Commissioner Danny Oberg sought clarification from the 
Attorney General as to the propriety of working for the 
Burlington Northern Railroad for a day to qualify for early 
retirement benefits. He had been on leave of absence from the 
BN during his tenure as commissioner.
These instances illustrate that there is no satisfactory 
mechanism for the review or determination of the propriety of 
such activities. These situations also demonstrate a major 
deficiency in the operations of Montana's government, namely 
Montana lacks any meaningful conflict of interest laws. This 
is the subject matter of this professional paper.
The problem with the present situation is that decisions 
concerning what constitutes acceptable behaviors are initially 
determined by the actors. They are guided only by their 
personal moral judgment, which may deviate from what society 
considers proper behavior. The press then plays its role of 
interpreter and enforcer of ethics considerations by writing 
a story or editorial on the matter. If an article appears 
raising the issue of impropriety of a public official, then 
that person immediately faces potential public ridicule and 
must explain his or her position in the public forum. In this 
case everyone loses. Some may argue that only the press can 
deter conflicts of interest through their exposure. However, 
the press can not invoke penalties against public officials.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The press may play the role of the deterrent, but they cannot 
act as the enforcer.
If some entity issued advisory opinions prior to the 
action, then the public official would have some protection 
from public ridicule and the public could be protected from 
the bad ethical judgments of its officials. The opinion would 
help to insure that the public official's action is consistent 
with the state's best interest. While this would not stop all 
improprieties, it would reduce the likelihood of the problem.
If a conflict of interest violation occurs, then there 
should be some method of enforcing ethics laws short of 
criminal prosecution. Under the present system, a press story 
about an alleged conflict of interest will not for certain 
stop the official from continuing the activity. The story can 
only bring some compliance through public shame and ridicule.
Clearly we are all losers under our present system. 
Questions of impropriety by a public official erode public 
confidence in government and raise doubts about the integrity 
of the institution.^ "Great danger looms: ' For as public
officials continue to betray the public trust, the erosion of 
democracy necessary follows.'"^
This paper argues that Montana needs a meaningful 
conflict of interest statute to implement the Montana
^Bob Gerwitt, "Deadly Sins & Wounded Legislatures," Governing. June 1991 at 26.
^Robert Bauer, " Law and Ethics in Political Life," 
Journal of Law and Politics. (Spring 93): 461.
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Constitution's mandate to preclude conflicts between public 
duty and private interest. The paper begins by tracing the 
history of the conflict of interest laws in Montana. It then 
reviews current literature regarding implementing and 
enforcing effective conflict of interest laws and some leading 
states' approaches to controlling conflict of interest 
problems. Finally, drawing upon this material, the paper 
suggests legislation to establish effective and enforceable 
conflict of interest laws in Montana and makes suggestions for 
the passage of the legislation.
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PART I.
BACKGROtlND OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS IN MONTANA
Conflict of interest laws are not new in Montana. Such 
laws date back to 1889. In 1972 the new Montana Constitution 
called for a code of ethics to prohibit conflict between 
public duty and private interest. The legislature enacted the 
Code of Ethics Act to meet the constitutional mandate. 
However, neither this act nor the constitutional provision 
offer enforcement provisions which mitigate conflicts of 
interest. Therefore, it is appropriate to review the history 
of conflict of interest statutes and rules and their 
interpretation to explain why there has been a failure in 
Montana to have meaningful control over conflicts of interest.
In reviewing conflict of interest laws, it is necessary 
to understand the concept and its origins. The idea of 
conflict of interest has its roots in the early writings of 
western society. The biblical expression, "No man can serve 
two masters," perhaps best demonstrates such origins.
Black's Law Dictionary defines conflict of interest as, 
"a clash between public interest and the private pecuniary 
interest of the individual concerned. Courts that have 
dealt with this matter have expressed the idea as follows: 
"The conflict of interest theory is based . . .  on the fact 
that an individual occupying a public position uses the trust
B̂lack's Law Dictionary. 5th ed. (1979) at 271
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imposed in him and the position he occupies to further his own 
personal gain. It is the influence he exerts in his official 
position to gain personally in spite of his official trust 
which is the evil the law seeks to eradicate. "A ' conflict 
of interest' may be defined as any circumstance in which the 
personal interest of a public official in a matter before him 
in his official capacity may prevent or appear to prevent him 
from making an unbiased decision with respect to a matter.
The 1889 Montana Constitution addressed a conflict of 
interest in Article V, Section 30. The section prohibited 
very limited forms of conflict of interest The focus of the 
prohibition centered on a public official's private interest 
in public contracts.
The Montana legislature in the early days of statehood 
enacted laws that prohibited personal gain from positions of 
power. The laws, however, were limited in scope to conflict
Ĉoral Gables v. Weskler. 164 So.2nd 260, 263 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1964).
Fighting Conflicts of Interest in Officialdom: 
Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial 
Disclosure Laws," 73 Mich. L. Rev. 758 (1975).
^Mont. Const, of 1889, Art. V, § 30. "All stationery, 
printing, paper, fuel and lights used in the legislative and 
other departments of government, shall be furnished, and the 
printing, and binding and distribution of the laws, journals, 
and department reports and other printing and binding, and the 
repairing and furnishing the halls and rooms used for the 
meeting of the legislative assembly, and its committees shall 
be performed under contract, to be given to the lowest 
responsible bidder below such maximum price and under such 
regulations as may be prescribed by law. No member or officer 
of any department of government shall be in any way interested 
in any such contracts; . . . "
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of interests involving contracts :
"Members of the legislative assembly, state, 
county, city, town, or township officers, must not 
be interested in any contract made by them in their 
official capacity or by any body or board of which 
they are members."*
The legislature also adopted miscellaneous conflict of 
interest laws, such as anti-nepotism laws to prohibit an 
official from hiring his family,® statutes prohibiting county 
commissioners from entering into private contacts with their 
county, and a prohibition of land board members from holding 
an interest in a state lands lease.“ Between the time of 
the enactment of these statutes and the adoption of the 1972 
Montana Constitution, only one Montana Supreme Court case 
arose involving the enforcement of the contract conflict of 
interest laws. The nepotism statutes resulted in only two 
cases in the Montana Supreme Court during this period.This 
paucity of cases suggests that either there was little 
enforcement of these statutes or there was never a challenge 
to the proceedings. In 1972 the Montana Constitutional 
Convention dealt with the issue of conflict of interest.
'Political Codes of Montana, § 1023 (1895).
®1933 Mont. Laws, Ch. 12.
°̂See Mont. Code Ann. § 7-5-2106.
“See Mont. Code Ann. § 77-1-113.
“Gradv V. Livingston. 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943).
“Hoaaland V. School District. 116 Mont. 608, 151 P.2d 168 
(1944); Kurth v. Grinde. 96 Mont. 608, 32 P.2d 15 (1934).
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Instead of taking a specific approach, the delegates took a 
more general approach. Initially, Delegate Aronow introduced 
language which prohibited conflict of interest in government 
contracts. His language read similar to the above mentioned 
statute :
"No member or officer of any department of the 
government shall be in any way interested in any 
contract with the state or any of its agencies or 
departments. "
In the debate on the matter it became clear that the 
language did not meet the desired effect of establishing "a 
policy and standard of honesty and fair dealing on the part of 
officers and employees of state government."*^ The debate 
indicated that there were many conflict situations that the 
provision did not contemplate. Delegate Vermillion then 
introduced a substitute motion containing the following 
language :
"A code of ethics for all state officials, 
officers, legislators and state employees 
prohibiting conflict between public duty and 
private interest shall be described by law.
This language was later adjusted during the style and
drafting part of the constitutional convention to read in its
present form found at Article XIII, Section 4.
Code of ethics. The legislature shall provide a
*'*Mont. Const. Con. 1972, Trans. Vol. IV at 793.
*^ont. Const. Con. 1972, Trans. Vol. IV at 793.
*^ont. Const. Con. 1972, Trans. Vol. IV at 79 6.
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code of ethics prohibiting conflict between public 
duty and private interest for members of the 
legislature and all state and local officers and 
employees.
In describing the purpose of the provision Delegate Vermillion 
said:
"I think Mr. Aronow has brought up a very important 
area here, the conflict of interest; but as you can 
see from the questions that have been raised 
tonight that it is a difficult area to deal with in 
a constitution. . . . The 1989 Constitution has
several sections on it and I think perhaps this 
broad area in the proposed section might mandate 
the Legislature to have conflict of interest laws 
but that for us to spell them out here might prove 
to be a difficult task. But if we do mandate, we 
do ask the Legislature to have conflict of interest 
laws, as in the case of Florida, I think that the
Legislature would see fit to follow up on this and
give us some good, workable laws to take care of 
some of the problems that Mr. Aronow has pointed 
out, and some of the other delegates here have 
pointed out. Conflict of interest is an important 
area; it's a problem that has been developed and
[sic] think with this section that I propose, we
would not find ourselves getting into an area of 
problem, but instead leave it up to the
Legislature.
What is most revealing about Delegate Vermillion's 
comments is his recognition of the difficulty of the subject 
matter. It may not be hard to recognize a conflict of 
interest when it occurs, but it is hard to establish 
provisions to prohibit it.
The Constitution was approved by the voters in June of 
1972, but it took five years before the legislature finally 
implemented the code of ethics. After three legislative 
sessions the forty-fifth legislative assembly finally dealt
■̂’Mont. Const. Con. 1972, Trans. Vol. IV at 796.
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with the matter. This was perhaps the last item in the 19 72 
Constitution that the legislature implemented. The 19 77 
legislature passed HB 462 which established "The code of 
ethics for elected officials and prohibited conflicts of 
interest." However, despite the enactment of a code of 
ethics, the legislature failed to establish any enforcement 
mechanism. The original form of the bill, which contained 
enforcement procedures, failed on second reading in the House 
on a 46-48 vote. "After the bill failed to pass the House, it 
was sent back to committee. Almost all of its teeth were 
pulled, including the entire section dealing with enforcement. 
This hollow shell of HB 462 then strongly passed the House 
(76-19) . "1*
The legislature recognized the difficulties in 
establishing the code of ethics in the statute's statement of 
purpose :
Statement of purpose. The purpose of this part is 
to set forth a code of ethics between public duty 
and private interest as required by the 
constitution of Montana. This code recognizes 
distinctions between legislators, other officers 
and employees of state government, and officers and 
employees of local government and prescribes some 
standards of conduct common to all categories and 
some standards of conduct adapted to each category.
The provisions of this part recognize that some 
actions are conflicts per se between public duty 
and private interest while other actions may or may 
not pose such conflicts depending upon the 
surrounding circumstances.^®
‘̂'"Common Cause of Montana Special Bulletin," 1977. 
®̂See Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-101.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
The legislature laid down some general principles and 
rules for conduct to avoid conflict of interest situations. 
The legislature then added the limited enforcement section 
that gave the Secretary of State the authority to: (1) issue
advisory opinions, (2) keep and permit public access to 
voluntary disclosure statements and (3) "make rules for the 
conduct of his affairs under this part. " As with the 
constitution, the legislature delegated its decision-making to 
some other entity. It appeared the task was too politically 
difficult for legislators to reach a consensus on what would 
or would not constitute a conflict of interest. Therefore, it 
would be the duty of the Secretary of State to decide what 
comprises conflict of interest in the specific case, with no 
means to enforce violations of conflict of interest.
Within a few months after the passage of the legislation, 
the Secretary of State's office received its first request for 
determining the proper course of action in a conflict 
situation. The Missoula County Attorney asked for an opinion 
regarding several conflict of interest situations involving 
county officials. (One of those conflicts involved Missoula 
County Commissioner, Jim Waltermire. ) The Secretary of State 
did the easy thing; he bucked the question to the Attorney 
General for his opinion. In 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 104, the 
Attorney General determined the matter. During the remaining 
years of Secretary of State Frank Murray's term of office, he
20See Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-132.
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issued no advisory opinions. All conflict of interest matters 
were handled in opinions issued by the Attorney General upon 
direct requests of county attorneys
In 1979 the legislature attempted to clarify the 1977 act 
by strengthening the provisions in Title 2, Part 2. These 
bills met resounding defeat in the Montana House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s I n  1981 another bill to strengthen and 
clarify ethics provisions met its demise in the H o u s e . T h e  
1981 Legislature did, however, pass Senate Joint Resolution 36 
which called for an interim legislative committee to be 
assigned the task of studying the code of ethics for the 
purpose of making improvements to the statutes 
Unfortunately the resolution failed to achieve a high enough 
level of priority to result in an interim study. The 
resolution once again identified the problem, but no action 
was taken.
Meanwhile, Jim Waltermire succeeded Frank Murray as 
Secretary of State. In his first opportunity to address the
^̂ 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 55, 79, 103 (1979-1980).
^^Montana House Journal, 432, 970 (1979).
^^ontana House Journal, 290 (1981).
^ont. Sess. Laws, Vol. II, 1577.
^At the end of each session the legislature rates the 
proposed study resolutions in priority order. Only the top 
few topics are assigned interim study status. The rest of the 
resolution studies are deposited in the files, usually never to be heard of again.
26See appendix for copy of resolution.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
issue, Waltermire declined to issue an official advisory
opinion. This opinion was sought by Senator Eck(D) and
Representative McBride(D) regarding the conduct of Senator
Anderson(R). The requested opinion was charged with politics
and met with a political result. The Great Falls Tribune
reported the matter this way:
Waltermire last week declined to review the conduct 
of Sen. Mike Anderson, R-Belgrade, who earlier this 
year reminded his Republican colleagues that the 
insurance industry has been a generous contributor 
to GOP legislative campaigns. At the time, 
Anderson - who is an insurance agent - was trying 
unsuccessfully to legalize the sale of life
insurance policies that are invested in common
stocks. . . .
Waltermire, in the first ruling of its kind said
the code gave him no power to review the past
actions of a legislator but only to answer 
questions about prospective future actions. . . .
Eck and McBride responded to that ruling Tuesday by 
introducing a resolution saying Waltermire's 
opinion "demonstrated deficiencies in the current 
Code of Ethics and (has) raised questions of 
interpretation, administration and enforcement.^^
This incident resulted in the introduction and passage of the
before-mentioned Senate Resolution 36.
Shortly after the 1981 session ended. Secretary of State
Waltermire proposed rules pursuant to §2-2-132, Montana Code
Annotated to implement the Code of Ethics Act. In June 19 81,
a hearing was held to consider the proposed rules. Seven
people testified at the hearing with only one person (counsel
to the Secretary of State) speaking in support of the rules.
27,Great Falls Tribune. April 22, 1981 at 9-D.
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The group of opponents included: the League of Women Voters, 
Common Cause, the Montana Democratic Party, Montana AFL-CIO 
and other i n d i v i d u a l s T h e  general consensus of the 
opponents was the belief that the rules failed to deal with 
ethics violations. Representative McBride summed up the 
opposition's position by saying: "If the interpretation of
the statute by the Secretary of State is to be so narrow and 
restrictive as to render this statutory provision meaningless 
in my judgment, then the public may be justified in asking if 
the Secretary of State is attempting to avoid his 
respons ibility
Waltermire decided not to adopt the proposed rules but 
instead sought an Attorney General's Opinion regarding his 
authority to adopt the rules. In a tersely worded letter he 
asked for an opinion from the Democratic Attorney General Mike 
Greely. The letter started out by saying, "I'm tired of 
Montana's Code of Ethics being used as a political ploy.. . . 
The kinds of shallow accusations that have been coming from 
the Democrat's Executive Secretary do a great disservice to 
the cause of improved ethics administration in this state. 
This concerns me very much because I am committed to a strong
^*Admin. Ethics Rules Hearing, Testimony sign-in sheet, 
June 17, 1981.
’̂Letter from Kathleen McBride to Jim Waltermire (June 17, 
1981).
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workable ethics code for all Montanans."^® He then went on to 
ask the Attorney General's opinion on nine principal questions 
and thirty-six sub-issues.
Waltermire received an Attorney General's Opinion in 
reply which held:
1. The Secretary of State is required to issue 
advisory opinions, permit public access to 
voluntary disclosure statements, and adopt rules 
concerning the conduct of his affairs pursuant to 
the provisions of the Montana Code of Ethics.
2. The Secretary of State is required to issue 
advisory opinions concerning the ethical conduct of 
either the requesting party or a third party.
3. The method of conducting the Secretary's duties 
under the Code of Ethics is within the discretion 
of the Secretary of State.
Not surprisingly the opinion reflected the position of 
the opponents at the June 1981 hearing. Waltermire again 
faced the task of implementing rules. The June rules, which 
provided a very narrow role for the Secretary of State in 
reviewing ethics violations, now had to be expanded to deal 
with an apparently enlarged role for the Secretary of State's 
office.
On November 2, 19 81, Waltermire proposed a new set of
rules which established a six-person ethics commission. 
This commission would handle all matters of ethics violations
“̂Letter from Jim Waltermire to Mike Greely (July 24, 
1981).
^̂ 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1981) .
^̂ Mont. Admin. Reg. (1981), Issue No. 21, 1367.
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and issue advisory opinions.These rules resulted in one 
more delegation of the duty of enforcement of conflict of 
interest determinations. The chain of delegation had now 
reached the forth level: Montana Constitution to Legislature
to Secretary of State to Ethics Commission.
Following the notice of the proposed rules, new opponents 
emerged to attack Waltermire. This time the Legislative 
Council's Administrative Code Committee and then House Speaker 
Bob Marks (Republican) objected to the rules. The new 
opponents joined the earlier mentioned opponents in 
criticizing Waltermire for proposing rules that went beyond 
the legislative intent. They objected to the delegation of 
authority to a commission not identified in the statutes.
The press also became critical of Waltermire's proposed 
ethics commission. They objected to the abdication of the 
duty to make a decision regarding ethical matters. "He can 
let the commission render its decisions and then sit back and 
say, 'Don't blame me, I didn't have anything to do with that 
decision. ' "̂4
Two memoranda from the Secretary of State's Office legal
^̂Rule IV. Purpose. (1) The purpose of the Montana 
Ethics Commission is to examine requests for advisory opinions 
which are received by the secretary of state and determine if 
further consideration of the request is warranted. If so, the 
commission will examine the facts known to it or found as a 
result of any investigation it may conduct or of any hearing 
it may hold, apply the standards established in the Code of 
Ethics to those facts, and adopt the advisory opinion to be 
issued by the secretary of state.
34Helena Independent Record. December 14, 1981, Editorial.
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counsel Alan Robertson to Waltermire reveal that the rules 
dispute had turned into an intra-party and personal squabble 
between Waltermire and Marks. Marks had sent two letters 
highly critical of the proposed rules. The Robertson 
memoranda suggested ways to fight Marks. Interestingly, the 
memos hinted that the basis of the disagreement rested in 
dispute over a private land transaction between Waltermire 
and Marks :
The options {of dealing with the criticism of the 
rules) I see are these: First, let the war
continue. . . -
The second option would be somehow to attempt to 
separate the personal business aspects of this 
controversy from the political/state government 
business aspects. . . .
The third option would be some kind of 
reconciliation scenario. For example, if you could 
work the $30,000 cash deal and make the annual 
payment, thus keeping the land, it would be 
possible to apologize for any trouble caused and 
blame it on financial pressures and go forward in a 
positive manner.
I want you to know that I know I'm advising you 
only on a political basis. I want you to know that 
I do not think you are at fault in your business 
transaction. I certainly don't know enough about 
it. Plus I have complete confidence and trust in 
what you're doing. I only mean to point out, as I 
did with the Missoula County salary situation, the 
potential consequences of actions which may be 
taken for personal reasons. Only you can make 
those choices ultimately, and I'm completely 
willing to support and deal with whatever you 
decide.
In hindsight, it probably would have been better 
not to have gotten involved at all in a deal with 
this particular person.
^^emorandum from Alan Robertson to Jim Waltermire (November 29, 1981).
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In December 19 81, Waltermire proceeded to adopt amended 
rules that established the ethics commission.^^ He then named 
members to the commission and they began reviewing alleged 
conflict of interest violations
Shortly after the ethics committee began functioning, a 
group of people brought a legal challenge seeking to enjoin 
the actions of the ethics commission. Judge Bennett issued an 
"Opinion and Order," dated July 9, 1982, which found
unconstitutional the statutes that granted the Secretary of 
State authority to issue advisory opinions.^* Judge Bennett, 
in a cleverly worded opinion, expressed the entire matter as 
follows :
Conceding, for the sake of argument only, that the 
legislature intended the opinions called for by 
Sections 2-2-132(1) to have something to do with 
the code of ethics laid down in the rest of the 
statute, one is left to speculate as to whether 
these are opinions as to the rules of conduct and 
the violation of a fiduciary duty (covered by 
Sections 2-2-104, 2-2-111, 2-2-121 and 2-2-125), in 
which case they would be legal opinions, or whether 
they are opinions having to do with ethical 
principles (covered by Sections 2-2-105 and 2-2- 
122) , in which case they would be moral opinions, 
not having to do with the legal concept of breach 
of public trust. And it would seem that if the 
opinions were legal in nature they would be 
trenching on the prerogative, generally considered 
up until now to be exclusive, of the attorney 
general. (Section 2-15-501(7) and the common law
^ont. Admin. Reg. (1981), Issue No. 24, 1936.
”The initial members of the commission included: Jane
Hudson, chairman, Wanda Alsaker, Carrol Graham, Jack E. King, 
Franklin Stayaert, and James Vidal.
^̂ State, ex rel. Spencer et al. v. Jim Waltermire. et al.. 
First Judicial District, Cause No. 47692 (1982).
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antedating out statehood.) If, on the other hand, 
the opinions were moral in nature it would seem 
they would be trenching on the prerogative of the 
Pope and other ecclesiastical authority. It is 
difficult to believe that the legislature intended 
to establish the Secretary of State as either an 
auxiliary attorney general or the state's vicar of 
morality, yet those seem to be the two functions 
assigned by the section in question. Nothing, 
nothing at all, is provided the hapless Secretary 
of State in the way of guidance as to why, what, 
when, where or how these opinions are to be 
generated. The mystery created by the cryptic 
legislative command is so deep the Secretary was 
moved to ask the legal advice of the individual he 
apparently was intended to replace, the attorney 
general, on not one but nine principal issues and 
approximately 3 6 sub-issues before he could proceed 
with any confidence to sanitize the body politic.
(July 24, 1981 letter.) The attorney general
shrewdly limited his answers to three (Opinion 39- 
31, 9/01/81) . He advised the Secretary had no
choice, he must issue some kind of opinion to 
anybody that might ask about anything without 
mentioning anybody's name. Whereupon, the
Secretary provided his own guidance by way of 
promulgating an extensive body of law, in the form 
of rules, and establishing an advisory commission, 
presumably to provide the advice and direction 
denied him by the legislature and the attorney 
general.
All to the point that no one, however insightful of 
legislative intent, could possibly provide 
administrative implementation of the section in 
question with any confidence that he was carrying 
out the will of either the electorate, expressed in 
their approval of the 1972 Montana Constitution, or 
of the forty-fifth legislative assembly. By simply 
authorizing the Secretary of State to "issue 
advisory opinions" the legislature ceded nearly its 
entire constitutional obligation and authority to 
effectuate a code of ethics to that officer and, we 
hope, wished him well
With that opinion the conflict of interest statutes met 
a major blow. There now exists little if any enforcement
39Ibid., 3, 4.
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capabilities in the code of ethics. Admittedly, there may be 
civil penalties that can be assessed against individuals for 
enjoying private benefits through a public position. But the 
remedy would be to return whatever benefit that is received. 
Additionally, certain conflicts of interest could give rise to 
criminal activities such as bribery,compensation for past 
official behavior,'*̂  gifts to public servants by persons 
subject to their jurisdiction,*^ or official misconduct.*^ 
However, prosecution has rarely occurred and the burden of 
proof would make these cases difficult to prove. In essence 
the Montana code of ethics is a dead body of laws. Only 
public shame through the press provides negative sanction for 
public officials.
As demonstrated in the development of the code of ethics 
laws, no one entity wanted to assume responsibility for 
answering the difficult question of what constitutes a 
conflict of interest. The political mess that surrounded the 
entire process, with perhaps the exception of the 
constitutional convention, destroyed any chance for meaningful 
regulation. Pervasive throughout the implementation of the 
rules were conflicts of personalities, personal agreements, 
and political motivations which prevented meeting the public
*®Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-101.
*̂ Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-103.
*̂ Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-104.
*^ont. Code Ann. § 45-7-401.
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duty -- assuming the public duty could be fulfilled in the 
first place.
After the Bennett ruling, other legislation has been 
introduced. Two measures called for placing the ethics 
enforcement with the Commissioner of Campaign Practices 
Office.'” In 1991 and 1993, legislation was introduced to 
address the lack-of-enforcement problem. In 1991, House Bills 
632 and 633 failed to make it out of committee. In 1993, 
House Bill 227 passed second reading in the House but was sent 
to the appropriations committee for a quiet d e a t h . H o u s e  
Bill 94 passed out of committee after extensive revision and 
made its way to the Senate for its defeat during second 
reading debate.” During debate on House Bill 94, one state 
senator expressed his opinion about the need for ethics laws 
as follows : "I resent the implication that we're doing wrong
or that we need this type of legislation.
It remains clear that no one has resolved the problem of
”House Bill 689 (1983); House Bill 107 (1987).
”Under Montana House of Representative procedures, house 
bills that have a fiscal impact can be referred to the
Appropriations Committee for its approval. Sending a bill to 
the Appropriations Committee is tantamount to killing the bill 
without voting against it.
”House Bill 94 would have tightened restrictions on
conflicts of interest for legislators. The 28-22 majority in 
the Senate apparently felt that the laws were not needed 
because there was no problem.
'̂̂The Montana Standard. April 1, 1993 at 12. Statement
made during 2nd Reading debate by Senator Gary Aklestad (R-
Galata) on HB 94 (new ethics code for legislators).
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how to get meaningful conflict of interest legislation passed. 
It resembles the children's story about, "Who will bell the 
cat?"
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PART II.
SURVEY OF LITERATURE AND STATE STATUTES
Molly Ivins, a reporter for the Dallas Times Herald, 
summed up the attitude of legislators about conflict of 
interest problems as follows: "As they say around the
legislature, if you can't drink their whiskey, screw their 
women, take their money, and vote against them anyway, you 
don't belong in office."^* While this attitude may explain 
legislative behavior, it does little to restore public 
confidence in government. Therefore, it is necessary to 
explore the literature discussing conflict of interest laws to 
discover workable solutions.
Part I of this paper identifies the historical context of 
the conflict of interest laws in Montana. It demonstrates why 
it has been so difficult to establish enforceable conflict of 
interest statutes. This part surveys literature on the 
conflict of interest laws and reviews some of the leading 
states' conflict of interest statutes. This part analyzes 
conflict of interest laws in two ways. First, it focuses on 
the limitations of conflict of interest laws. It discusses
what can or cannot be accomplished by promulgating these laws. 
Second, it identifies the components of the laws and the 
various approaches taken by some leading states. These 
components include prevention, prohibition, and enforcement.
'‘̂Mol ly Ivins, Molly Ivins Can't Sav That. Can She?
( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  1 .
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This part also reviews practical and political problems that 
must be overcome for the laws to become effective.
LIMITATIONS IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 
In the pursuit of creating enforceable conflict of 
interest laws it remains important to recognize what can and 
cannot be accomplished- First, no set of laws can change the 
character of the individuals asked to follow them. Second, 
not all conflict of interest situations can be avoided because 
certain features of overly restrictive laws will be ignored. 
The laws must be balanced and reasonable and not overly 
restrictive to be enforceable.
It would be naive to believe that the passage of 
enforceable laws is the panacea to conflict of interest 
problems. "A common criticism of ethics laws is that one 
cannot legislate e t h i c s . L a w s  do not change a person's 
character, but they might keep a good person honest. "We tend 
to expect too much from laws and demand too little from 
people."^® The laws themselves cannot supplant the need for 
voters to elect good people with reputations for integrity. 
Public officials will decline to do what society fails to
'‘Michael Josephs on, "Ethics Legislation: Problems and 
Potential," State Legislatures. July 1989, 30.
“̂Michael S. Josephson, "Traversing the Mine Field of 
Public Service Ethics," The Journal of State Government 62, 
No. 5, 185.
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promote.Therefore, conflict of interest laws will only 
carry as much weight as society gives them. If the public 
fails to elect honest candidates or fails to remove corrupt 
officials, these laws will have no effect. Ultimately, the 
integrity of government lies not in having understandable and 
enforceable conflict of interest laws, but in having public 
officials who do not need those laws imposed against them.
It is perhaps easier to instill proper conduct in elected 
officials through having virtuous people in office then by 
having enforceable conflict of interest laws. Those people 
can lead by exaimple and discourage unethical behavior among 
their colleagues. "Personal example, however is not enough. 
After all, people pass from the scene -- some sooner and some 
l a t e r . F u r t h e r ,  even the most honest can bend under the 
pressures of the office. "The temptations that come to people 
who hold elected office, particularly in a legislature or 
Congress, are far greater and more numerous than most of them 
will ever encounter elsewhere. Their decisions can create 
monopolies, bail out failure and make companies and 
individuals rich. Therefore, even honest officials can be
^^John Feerick, "Do We Really Want Ethical Government?" 
New York State Bar Journal. (Jan. 1992): 8-11.
^^Charles E. Roemer, III, "Putting Honesty in Politics," 
Journal of State Government 62, No. 5, 171.
^ T̂om Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures isn't 
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. (Nov. 1991): 11.
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corrupted without conflict of interest laws.
It remains important to keep a focus on what problem is 
being eradicated by conflict of interest laws and how that can 
be best accomplished. The effectiveness of the laws is 
limited to their reasonableness. For the laws to be 
reasonable there must be a balance between overly restrictive 
and loose laws. If the laws are overly restrictive, they 
will not be enforced. If the laws are too loose, the 
loopholes could permit unacceptable behavior. For example, 
if the law prohibited a legislator from receiving "anything of 
value" from a lobbyist, then technically the act of receiving 
a free cup of coffee could violate the act. A prosecutor 
would refuse to prosecute or have a hard time convicting an 
elected official for the violation of the law for one cup of 
coffee. Such overly restrictive laws are either ignored or 
ridiculed. Conversely, public scandals can occur even though 
the questionable behavior is technically legal.
Unfortunately, it usually takes the public outrage of a 
scandal to pass strong conflict of interest legislation.” 
"History tells us that unless pressed by the backlash from 
scandal, political leaders will almost invariably ignore
^*Karen Hansen, "Walking the Ethical Tightrope," State 
Legislatures. (July 1988): 17.
”ln 1991, House Bills 632 and 633 (very restrictive 
conflict of interest legislation) died swift deaths in the 
House State Administration Committee.
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proposals for ethics reform. "There is no doubt that some
of the fallout (from a governmental ethics scandal) has been
healthy. Ethics reforms that were sorely needed but seemed
unattainable gained new life. However, following a scandal
the legislature often enacts statutes that contain overly
restrictive provisions.^® In reaction to conflict of interest
scandals, lawmakers have absolutely prohibited decision-makers
from taking "anything of value" from interested persons. This
prohibition includes anything from vacation trips to cups of
coffee. South Carolina's Attorney General explained this
interpretation as follows :
Because it was not entirely clear what that meant,
(a thing of value) , many of the lawmakers were 
jolted by Attorney General Michael J. Bower's 
opinion that the new language prohibits legislators 
from receiving any of the gifts and free trips they 
had been accustomed to, cups of coffee and exotic 
vacations alike. Bowers says he doubts that anyone 
will be prosecuted for accepting a free meal, but 
he suggests that the law be observed to the 
letter.^
These overly restrictive provisions could plant the seeds 
for inconsistency in the enforcement of the laws. On the 
other hand, you end up with the type of laws the state of 
Montana has on the books if there is no impetus to enact
^®John Feerick, "Do We Really Want Ethical Government?" 
Id. at 10.
^̂ Bob Gerwitt, "Deadly Stings & Wounded Legislatures," 
Governing. June 1991, 28.
^®Jeffrey L. Katz, "Sipping from the Cup of Corruption," 
Governing. Nov. 1991, 27.
"Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
meaningful conflict of interest laws. As shown above, 
Montana's laws are nebulous and unenforceable.
If you accept the contention that conflict of interest 
laws must be reasonable (neither too stringent nor too 
lenient), then it follows that not all conflicts of interest 
will be prevented. As long as we have a system that requires 
raising funds to get elected, then we will have inherent 
conflicts of interest within the system that "reasonable” laws 
do not address. "The root of much corruption, according to 
Robert M. Stern, general counsel of the California Commission 
on Campaign Financing, is money and a political system that 
requires more and more of it to win and maintain office. 
Those who contribute large amounts of money to a candidate 
certainly have more influence when the candidate becomes an 
elected official. But "reasonable" laws only set the minimum 
acceptable standards for proper conduct of public officials. 
"Laws . . . establish standards of behavior that may or may
not correlate with individuals' consciences and do not purport 
to establish any more than minimal criteria for behavior.
For example, U.S. Senator Cranston violated no law by 
using his influence to assist the major savings and loan 
scandle kingpin Mr. Keating (a major contributor to his fund­
raisers) . Yet, the Senate Ethics Committee still condemned
“Karen Hansen, "Walking the Ethical Tightrope," Id. at
15.
®^Michael Josephson, "Ethics Legislation: Problems and
Potential," id.
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his actions. "'The Committee concluded that while "none of 
Senator Cranston's . . - activities concerning [Keating's
business] were [sic] illegal,' he had acted unethically by 
'substantially linking' fund-raising and legislative 
a c t i o n . T h e  laws can only control clearly defined and 
consensus backed violations of conflicts of interest; the 
voters must do the rest.
While strong enforceable conflict of interest laws may 
offer some deterrent effect, they are not the only deterrent. 
The former Speaker of the Wisconsin House of Representatives 
expresses his belief that the press serves an important role 
in controlling legislators' behavior: "Fear of the
consequences is the most important deterrent to unethical 
behavior, and fear of the press is paramount. A watchful, 
picky, even vengeful --but consistent--newspaper is better than 
legal structures that try to anticipate every possible human 
foible or temptation. The thud of the newspaper at the 
doorstep should make the politician's heart beat a little 
faster.
Another expert on ethics put it this way -- the press, 
the public and the opposition party may be perhaps "the most
“Robert Bauer, "Law and Ethics in Political Life: 
Considering the Cranston Case," Journal of Law and Ethics. 
(Spring 1993): 464.
“Tom Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures isn't 
Paved with Tougher Laws," id.
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effective watchdogs of ethical behavior.However, as shown 
above there still is a need to establish enforceable conflict 
of interest laws to curb the behaviors that erode the public 
trust.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS 
While there are many features of effective conflict of 
interest laws, they generally divide into three categories. 
Those components include: prevention, prohibitions, and
enforcement.
The elements of prevention include disclosure of 
financial interests, gifts, benefits received, and political 
contributions. Additional preventat ive measures involve 
advisory opinions and education. Preventative measures try to 
sensitize officials to ethical considerations and remind them 
of the possible sanctions for improper behavior.
The prohibition provisions identify and make illegal the 
activities which constitute conflicts of interests. Those 
prohibitions focus on the use of one's position for personal 
gain during and after the period of service. Some of the 
major prohibited conflicts of interest include:
■ Contracts between the state and state officials or 
employees who can personally benefit from the 
contract.
64
17
Karen Hansen, "Walking the Ethical Tightrope," id. at
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■ Exerting undue influence by virtue of one's 
position on behalf of family, clients, political 
contributors or receiving payments or gifts for 
actions taken.
■ Nepotism.
■ Representing an individual, for a fee or personal 
benefit, before governmental agencies while serving 
in public office.
■ Improper use of one's office resources for 
campaigning purposes.
■ Using one's public position for post-employment 
opportunities.
In the category of enforcement the statutes generally 
provide for investigations, hearing, prosecution, and
sanctions. Because of the political nature of conflict of 
interest violations, the structure of an enforcement agency 
must often be different from normal executive branch agencies 
to prevent abuses in enforcement. Such abuses could include 
prosecution of adversaries for political purposes. Improper 
or selective enforcement of conflict of interest laws creates 
results as abhorrent as the violations themselves. "Ethical 
standards can be violated not only by those whose conduct 
breaks the rules but also by those who interpret and enforce 
the rules, if they do so in a way -- and for a motive -- that 
violates and undermines the basic purposes those standards are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supposed to serve."
32
65
Preventative Statutes
As mentioned above, preventative conflict of interest 
statutes are designed to make officials aware of potential 
problems. To that end, disclosure of one's personal financial 
interests serves to sensitize office-holders to the presence 
of potential conflicts of interest.It also puts the world 
on notice of potential conflicts of interest the office-holder 
may have. "This provision allows public review and scrutiny of 
the private holdings of public servants to assure that these 
holdings do not pose a conflict with respect to the officials' 
public responsibilities."®^
However, these disclosures usually are not reviewed by 
anyone other than a few investigative reporters®* and those 
conducting opposition candidate research. While most believe 
disclosure information is a necessary component of effective 
conflict of interest laws, the extent of its usefulness
®^Bruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing?" Journal of 
State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 175.
®®Burke and Benson, "State Ethics Codes, Commissions and 
Conflicts," Journal of State Government. 62, No. 5 (1989) :
195 .
®^Mario Cuomo, "Restoring Trust in Government, " Journal of 
State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 177.
®*Burke and Benson, "State Ethic Codes, Commissions and 
Conflict," id. at 196.
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remains unknown/^ Further, there remains a question of the 
proper balance between the public's right to know and the 
public official's right to privacy. The disclosure laws 
also may have a chilling effect on participation in 
government; individuals may refuse to sacrifice their privacy 
for public service.
State disclosure requirements divide in two ways: who
has to file and the information they disclose. The state 
statutes range from no disclosure to extensive divulgence. 
The amount of information required usually depends upon the 
status of the office. State-wide elected officials typically 
must reveal much more financial information and gift receipts 
than lower level officials. Montana requires financial 
disclosure of only the business interests of elected 
officials, their spouses, and their immediate minor 
children.Montana's disclosure laws ignore top appointed 
officials, employees in key decision-making positions, hired 
consultants, and candidates for office. These statutes do not 
require the reporting of the receipt of gifts or other 
benefits bestowed upon the office holder.
‘̂’Ibid.
’“"Fighting Conflicts of Interest in Officialdom: 
Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial 
Disclosure Laws," 73 Mich. L. Rev. 758 (March 1975). Also 
see Mont. Const, of 1972, Art. II, § 9 (Right to Know about 
Government Operations) and § 10 (Right of Privacy).
’̂ Id. at 781.
’’Mont. Code Ann. § 5-7-213.
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Montana law does encourage voluntary disclosure of 
conflicts of interest/^ However, this provision seems to 
suggest that the questionable action is acceptable if 
disclosure is made. Michael Josephson, a recognized expert on 
ethics laws, expressed his criticism of disclosure laws as 
follows :
The non judgmental nature of revelation rules seems 
to suggest that all conduct is proper so long as it 
is disclosed. I am uncomfortable, for example, 
with the idea that honoraria or loans given to 
influential government officials can be considered 
proper just because they are reported. Such 
transactions ought to be prohibited.
Contrast Montana to the requirement of California,^^ 
South Carolina,'̂ ® T e x a s , a n d  W i s c o n s i n . C a l i f o r n i a  
requires all elected and key officials to disclose all 
economic interests and gifts in excess of $50.’” South 
Carolina requires disclosure statements from an extensive list
^^ont. Code Ann. § 2-2-131.
’̂'‘Michael Josephson, "Ethics Legislation: Problems and
Potential," id.
^^California often serves as a model state for other 
states in the west. It maintains modern conflict of interest 
laws with its latest amendments occurring in 1991.
®̂In 1991, South Carolina made major changes to its 
conflict of interest statutes following a scandal.
^Texas enacted major changes to its conflict of interest 
statutes in 1991.
^'Wisconsin has had stringent conflict of interest 
statutes for many years and recently tightened them even 
further.
79Cal. Gov't Code §§87202, 87207 and 87501.
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Of public officials and employees including hired consultants. 
These officials must disclose all economic interests and the 
receipt of "anything of value," only excluding gifts from 
family members.*® Texas requires all elected and key 
government officials and top officials in the political 
parties to disclose all economic activities and receipt of 
gifts of "anything of value," in excess of $250.*^ Wisconsin 
requires elected officials, candidates and key government 
officials to disclose all economic interests and gifts in 
excess of $50 except from family members.*^
The clear trend in the most recent enactments of conflict 
of interest laws is to require economic disclosures from all 
elected or appointed government officials who make key policy 
decisions. These disclosures usually include the receipt of 
gifts from non family members. While it may be excessive to 
require the reporting of every free cup of coffee received 
from a lobbyist, there needs to be an upgrade of the 
disclosure requirements in Montana.
The other aspects of preventative laws usually comes in 
the form of educational and advisory activities performed by 
the agency administering the conflict of interest law. These 
activities include educating those who must file disclosure
*®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1110 et seq. 
"Tex. Code Ann. Art. 6252-9b.
"Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.43.
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statements on the proper way of accomplishing that task.*^ 
Education also should include not only information about the 
do's and don'ts of the laws but also explanations about the 
principles surrounding the concepts of conflict of interest 
"People in government could benefit greatly from the 
opportunity for concentrated consideration of ethical problems 
they typically encounter, so they can learn more effective 
strategies to perceive and deal with the ethical implications 
of their conduct."*^
Equally important to education is the availability of 
both published and unpublished advisory opinions on real or 
hypothetical conflict of interest matters.®® These opinions 
inform the public and interested parties as to the specific 
do's and don'ts and offer an opportunity for individuals to 
seek advice before the questionable activities occur. They 
not only can prevent a questionable action from occurring, but 
also can save an official from potentially embarrassing after- 
the-fact scrutiny by the press. This unpublished information 
should remain confidential unless the requestor makes it 
public.
83S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320(2).
^ Michael Josephson, "Ethics Legislation: Problems and
Potential," id.
®̂ Ibid-
*®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320 (11) .
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Prohibitâtions
Conflict of interest prohibitions center around the 
identification of activities which constitute conflicts 
between private activities or benefits and public duty. While 
the Montana statutes cover most of the above-identified 
activities, they are often written in philosophical and obtuse 
language that sounds like biblical d i r e c t i v e s T h e  Montana 
laws also contain many gray areas which contain large 
loopholes
Montana prohibits nepotism*’ and contracts between state 
officials and the state.’® There are revolving door 
restrictions prohibiting former employees from contracting 
with his or her former agency.’* However, the restriction is 
only for six months and is limited to matters in which the 
employee was directly involved. This leaves much room for use 
of personal contacts and insider information gained through
87"The principles in this section are intended as guides 
to conduct and do not constitute violations as such of the 
public trust of office or employment in state or local 
government." Mont. Code Ann. §2-2-105 (1).
*®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-112(1) illustrates the looseness 
of the statutes. "The principles in this section are intended 
only as guides to legislator conduct and do not constitute violations as such of the public trust of legislative office." 
(emphasis added)
®’Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-301, et seq.
’®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-201, et seq. This section only 
prohibits contracts made by public officials in their official 
capacity.
’*Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-201.
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public employment-
Other states show more definitive prohibitions. The 
following paragraphs summarize those statutes.
Contracts between state officials or employees and the 
state.
This item on its face may be the easiest conflict to 
identify. Obviously public officials can not have an interest 
in a contract made by them in their official capacity 
However, there may be more than direct contracts that must be 
prohibited.
South Carolina prohibits public officials or employees 
from having an economic interest in a contract if he or she 
has an official function relating to the c o n t r a c t T e x a s  
prohibits the leasing of office space or real property between 
an elected official and the state. It further prohibits the 
receipt of fees for solicitation of contracts from the 
state.^
Exerting undue influence by virtue of one's position.
This provision precludes both accepting benefits from an 
individual seeking a special favor and using public office to 
advance one's economic interests. The offensive conduct may
’̂ Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-202.
®̂ Mont. Code Ann. § 8-13-775.
’'̂ Tex. Code Ann. Art. 6252-9b §§7C and 8A.
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include anything from taking bribes or kickbacks for the 
awarding of contracts, to accepting a cup of coffee from a 
lobbyist seeking favorable treatment of certain legislation.’̂ 
While Montana has criminal sanctions against the receipt of 
bribes and gifts,’® the present laws only provide a fuzzy 
prohibition against other related matters.
South Carolina makes a direct and broad prohibition 
against such activities:
(A) No public official, public member, or public 
employee may knowingly use his official office, 
membership, or employment to obtain an economic 
interest for himself, a member of his immediate 
family, and individual with whom he is associated, 
or a business with which he is associated. * * *
(B) No public official, public member, or public 
employee may make, or participate in making, or in 
any way attempt to use his office, memberships, or 
employment to influence a governmental decision in 
which he, a member of his immediate family, an 
individual with whom he is associated, or a 
business with which he is associated has an 
economic interest. * * *^
If officials in the course of official duties come across a
conflict of interest situation, then they are required to
disclose the conflict situation and decline to participate in
the decision-making activity.’*
Another South Carolina statute prohibits legislators from
voting on that portion of an appropriations bill which relates
’®Tom Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures isn't 
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. id.
’®Mont. Code Ann. §§45-7-101 and 45-7-104.
^S.C. Code Ann. §8-13-700.
’*Ibid.
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to an area of government that he has conducted business with
or before which he has represented clients. This would
address the concern that certain legislators employed by or
contracting with state government may be taking advantage of
their position to better fund the agency that employs them.
Likewise, it could prevent lawyer-legislators from using the
budget process to punish or reward governmental agencies that
adjudicated their clients' administrative contested cases.
This provision affects legislators employed in the public
sector or legislator-lawyers who represent clients before
administrative agencies.
The South Carolina statutes further prohibit offering
anything of value to influence public decision-making:
(A) A person may not, directly or indirectly, give, 
offer, or promise anything of value to a public 
official, public member, or public employee with 
the intent to: (1) influence the discharge of a
public official's, public member's, or public 
employee's official responsibilities; (2) influence 
a public official, public member, or public 
employee to commit, aid in committing, collude in, 
or allow fraud on a governmental entity; or (3) 
induce a public official, public member, or public 
employee to perform or fail to perform an act in 
violation of the public official's, public 
member's, or public employee's official 
responsibilities
Likewise, a public official could not solicit anything of
value for the above-mentioned purposes.
Older Wisconsin legislation presented a looser approach
”S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-705. 
“̂®Ibid.
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by not absolutely banning gifts or favors. It tempered the 
prohibitions by requiring a value judgment as to the 
likelihood that there would be an improper influence or 
economic gain as a result of the gift or action. This would 
permit the receipt of a cup of coffee or even a meal from a 
lobbyist trying to seek favorable treatment of certain 
legislation:
(2) No state public official may use his or her 
public position or office to obtain financial gain 
or anything of substantial value for the private 
benefit of himself or herself or his or her 
immediate family, or for an organization which he 
or she is associated.
(3) No person may offer or give to a state public 
official, directly or indirectly, and no state 
public official may solicit or accept from any 
person, directly or indirectly, anything of value 
if it could reasonably be expected to influence the 
state public official's vote, official actions or 
judgment, or could reasonably be considered as a 
reward for any official action or inaction on the 
part of the state public official. This subsection 
does not prohibit a state public official from 
engaging in outside employment.
* * *
(5) No state public official may use or attempt to 
use his public position to influence or gain 
unlawful benefits, advantages or privileges for 
himself or others.*®^
However, after a recent scandal the Wisconsin legislature
shortened subsections three and five to the following:
(3m) No state public official may accept or retain 
any transportation, lodging, meals, food or 
beverage, or reimbursement therefor, except in 
accordance with section 1956(3) [relating to 
honorariums, fee and expenses for speaking 
engagements]
®̂'Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.45. 
‘“Amended by 1989 Act 338, § 54.
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(5) No State public official may or attempt to use
the public position held by the public official to
influence or gain unlawful benefits, advantages or 
privileges personally or for others.
Additionally, the Wisconsin legislature specifically
prohibited the receipt of tickets or parking privileges for
sporting events.
California prohibits the use of official position for the
purpose of influencing a governmental decision "relating to
any person with whom he or she is negotiating, or has any
arrangement concerning, prospective employment.
Nepgfigm.
Nepotism is defined as "the bestowal of political 
patronage by reason of relationship rather than merit. 
The Montana statutes in this area are clear and unambiguous. 
Section 2-2-302, MCA generally prohibits a public official 
from employing family m e m b e r s . A  South Carolina statute 
includes provisions which address other personnel matters 
relating to an official's family member if that individual is 
already employed before the official assumes office:
^°^Amended by 1991 Act 316, § 182.
*°*Wis. Stat. Ann. §19.451.
°̂*Cal. Code Ann § 87407 Gov't. Code.
^°^ont- Code Ann. § 2-2-301.
°̂̂ There are some minor exceptions to this prohibition, 
such as a sheriff may appoint a family member as a cook or 
attendant.
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(A) No public official, public member, or public 
employee may cause the employment, appointment, 
promotion, transfer, or advancement of a family 
member to a state or local office or position in 
which the public official, public member, or public 
employee supervises or manages.
(B) A public official, public member, or public 
employee may not participate in an action relating 
to the discipline of the public official's, public 
members' s or public employee's family member.^®®
Representing others while serving in public office.
An emerging area in conflict of interest statutes is the
prohibition of public personnel from representing clients
before agencies or boards. The primary focus of this
prohibition is to prevent a public official or his family or
business associates from representing another person before a
governmental entity. The insider information, personal
contacts, and influence gained through one's position could
lead to an unfair advantage for the client. This also
prohibits state legislators who are attorneys from having
their firms represent clients before state agencies.
Improper use of one's office for campaigning purposes.
One of the often raised complaints about elected
officials is the use of their offices for campaign
p u r p o s e s . T h i s  concern is not limited to candidates for
®̂*S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-750.
S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-740.
llOf"'George Carinello, "Should Lawyers Be Legislators?" 
State Government News. (May 1991): 12. Also see Hastings Law 
Journal 41 (1989).
IllSee Missoulian. November 19, 1985 at 11.
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elected office seeking reelection or another office. It can
also apply to elected officials or public employees who may
have an interest in a ballot measure. Montana law somewhat
addresses this concern:
No public employee may solicit support for or 
opposition to any political committee, the 
nomination or election of any person to public 
office, or the passage of a ballot issue while on 
the job or at his place of employment. However, 
nothing in this section is intended to restrict the 
right of a public employee to express his personal 
political views.
South Carolina specifically prohibits the use of governmental
personnel or facilities for election purposes: "No person may
use government personnel, equipment, materials, or an office
building in an election campaign.
Using an office for future employment opportunities. 
This area of conflict of interest laws deals with 
prohibitions on the use of public office for employment 
opportunities after leaving a government position. This 
practice (revolving door activities) generated much criticism 
of President Reagan's appointees during his administration. 
The practice centers around officials either taking advantage 
of their position to obtain future employment or using insider 
information and personal contacts from their former position 
in post-office employment -- such as: lobbying or appearing
"^Mont. Codes Ann. § 13-35-226(3). 
”^S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-770.
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before the agency that had employed that individual. By 
Executive Order the Clinton administration prohibited former 
employees from having any contact with their former agency or 
lobby for up to five years.
State governments unfortunately can not draw upon high 
salaries or prestige to overcome tight revolving door 
restrictions in attracting good candidates for appointive 
positions. "While many states may be criticized for ignoring 
the problem of 'revolving doors,' care should be taken not to 
draw too strict barriers. Too tight of a 'revolving door' 
provision may make it difficult to recruit administrators.
Montana addresses the revolving door problem only to the 
extent it applies to interests in contracts with the state. 
Former employees cannot have any contractual ties to the state 
for six months after termination of their employment in 
matters directly related to their employment.**® This 
approach leaves major revolving door problems that should be 
addressed.
Some other state statutes require a one-year waiting 
period before having business contacts with the government. 
The type of contact with the government that is permitted 
depends upon the position and the activities of that position.
**'*Exec. Order No. 12834 (Jan 20, 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 13
(Jan. 22, 1993).
**̂ Burke and Benson, "State Ethics Codes, Commissions and 
Conflicts," Journal of State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 197.
**®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
California specifically precludes former legislators from 
lobbying the legislature or representing any other person 
before any state agency for the year immediately after leaving 
office. State officers are also prohibited from representing 
anyone before a state agency for one year following their 
leaving office. State employees and consultants are 
prohibited from representing anyone before the agency in which 
they were employed."^ A California statute also precludes 
having any involvement with a governmental decision pertaining 
to an entity with whom that person is negotiating 
employment.”® South Carolina prohibits accepting employment 
from "a person who is regulated by the agency or department on 
which the former public official, former public member, or 
former public employee served or was employed," if the 
employment involves a matter they participated in during their 
public service.”®
Enforcement
No matter what conflict of interest laws are enacted, 
they are ineffective without a workable enforcement mechanism. 
Enforcement needs to occur through an independent agency that 
has the ability to fairly and completely administer the laws. 
"A second essential is consistent application of the laws . .
”^Cal. Code Ann. § 87406, Gov't Code 
”®Cal Code Ann. § 87501, Gov't Code 
”®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-755.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
. . pursued to a guilty or not-guilty conclusion. Tom
Loftus, the former speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, came to
that conclusion after following an influence-peddling scandal
which happened in spite of strong state conflict of interest
laws. Strong laws without proper enforcement result in the
ignoring of the laws. Therefore, it is necessary to establish
a structure for enforcement that secures the consequences for
violating conflict of interest laws.
As shown above, Montana lacks any enforcement of conflict
of interest laws, with the exception of criminal prosecution
for bribery or official misconduct for receiving gifts from
those whom you regulate. This enforcement only addresses the
most flagrant of abuses of conflict of interest situations,
and little or no prosecution in this area has occurred. There
are no sanctions short of severe criminal prosecution to
control a conflict of interest problem.
Generally the states with modern conflict of interest
laws provide for their enforcement though ethics commissions.
In the post-Watergate years of 1974 to 1978, states 
rushed to write ethics laws that were mostly 
ineffective because there were few, if any, 
enforcement measures included. But in the past 
four years there has been a great deal of 
recodification, tightening of loopholes and 
wholesale revisions of some of these laws.*̂ *
The makeup of the enforcement agency is crucial because
^^om Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures Isn't 
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. id.
121,‘Karen Hansen, "Walking the Ethical Tightrope," id. at 
16 •
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it determines if the state will have "ethical politics" or 
"political ethics. "Ethical politics" is a game that
everyone wins, and "political ethics" is a game in which 
everyone loses because prosecution of violations is for 
political purposes.
There are two approaches to avoiding a partisan and 
abusive commission. The statutes can either acknowledge the 
political sensitivity of the commission and insure a balance 
between the major parties or alternatively attempt to sanitize 
the politics by selecting politically neutral members. 
Illustrative of the former method, the Texas Commission has 
eight members with an equal division between the political 
p a r t i e s . T h i s  division attempts to maintain a balance of 
interests between the major parties. Alternatively, South 
Carolina makes its governor select the ethics commission 
(subject to legislative confirmation) from supposedly 
politically neutral people with none of the members having any 
ties to government.*^
Derivatives of these formulas could include the methods 
used by Montana for appointing the Reapportionment 
Commission*^^ or selecting the Commissioner of Campaign
*̂ B̂ruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing, " id. 
*̂ T̂ex. Code Ann. § 1.04, Art. 6252-9d.l.
*^S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-13-310 and 8-13-330.
‘̂ ont. Code Ann. § 5-1-102.
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Practices In the former, the political balance is
achieved with one tie-breaker, politically neutral member 
selected by a majority of the partisan members. In the 
latter, the governor selects the Commissioner from a list 
submitted by the politically balanced legislative leadership.
Other important features of enforcement are the powers of 
the agency to investigate and prosecute conflict of interest 
violations. Commissions in other states have powers similar 
to those granted to state agencies under the Montana 
Administrative Practices Act (MAPA).*̂  ̂ Those powers include 
administrative searches, subpoenas and authority to conduct 
contested cases. However, due to the sensitive nature of 
these type of complaints, public disclosure of the proceedings 
may be limited until the case reaches final disposition.*^* 
These cases could be handled the same way the Commission on 
Practice presently handles lawyer discipline.
The enforcement agencies generally have the authority to 
either impose civil penalties or refer the matter for criminal 
prosecution. The civil penalties may include fines, 
restitution of inappropriately used funds, suspension or 
removal from office, revoking lobbying privileges, and the
*̂ ®Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-102.
*^5ee Mont. Code Ann., Tit- 2, Ch. 4.
*2*s.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320 (g) .
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cancellation of contracts.*^’ Additionally, sanctions can be 
imposed for failing to file timely financial disclosure 
reports. Some statutes provide for penalties against persons 
submitting fraudulent or frivolous claims.
Clearly the capacity to enforce conflict of interest laws 
rests greatly upon the quality and integrity of the members of 
the enforcement agency. But no matter how the members are 
selected or what the political balance of the commission is, 
it is equally important to have an enforcement agency with 
members who have solid political moxie and good political 
judgment. "Political judgment, in the classical sense of the 
term, is the capacity to tell the difference between public 
and private ends. It is also the ability to spot a private 
interest masquerading as a public good.
Finally, there must be a commitment by the legislature to 
fully fund the enforcement agency so it can do its job. The 
quality of the conflict of interest laws or of the individuals 
serving in the enforcement agency matters little if there is 
not a real financial commitment by the legislature to 
enforcement of the laws.
‘2’See S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1510; Tex. Code Ann. §1.28, 
Art. 6252-9d.l; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.53.
*^^is. Stat. Ann. § 19.53.
^̂ B̂ruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing?" id.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PART III.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Part I discussed the past (history of the conflict of 
interest laws in Montana) . Part II reviewed the present, 
through a survey of literature and statutes. Part III makes 
recommendations for the future of conflict of interest laws in 
Montana. Part III proposes legislation and a strategy for its 
passage in Montana. Attached to this paper is the appendix 
containing the proposed legislation.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The Council of State Governments, through its subgroup 
the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (COGEL), formed a 
committee to draft and recommend model ethics legislation. It 
sought to draft uniform legislation and find ways to deal with 
difficult issues (as identified in this paper). A f t e r  
reviewing conflict of interest legislation from other states 
it becomes clear that the model legislation prepared by COGEL 
offered a composite of the most advantageous features from all 
of the states. The "Model Law for Campaign Finance, Ethics 
and Lobbying Regulation" offers a balanced and comprehensive 
approach to addressing conflict of interest issues identified 
in Part II. COGEL's membership includes a geographical 
diverse group of people involved with different aspects of 
ethics laws. This group included experts in the fields of 
campaign finance, ethics and lobbying regulation. All the
51
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council members have experience in the regulation of 
governmental ethics. COGEL operates with assistance and 
support staff from the Council of State Governments (CSG).
While the model legislation deals with more than conflict 
of interests issueŝ ^̂ , the "Ethics" part that focuses on 
conflicts of interest makes a suitable starting point for 
drafting proposed legislation. The legislation found in the 
appendix relies heavily on the language found in the model 
act. The proposed legislation deviates from the model act in 
areas that require modification for passage and operation in 
Montana.
This legislation provides softer prohibitions than the 
model legislation. This makes its passage more likely because 
legislators are not likely to pass strict measures which 
control their own behavior. Specifically, it is acceptable to 
receive minor gifts, meals and "anything of value" in 
reasonable small monetary values under an aggregate amount of 
$500 a year. Reporting is not necessary for the receipt of 
anything of value in an aggregate amount of less than $500 a 
year. This recognizes the difficulty in enforcing
prohibitions as stringent as the South Carolina laws. It 
further makes financial discloser requirements apply only to
132 "A Model Law for Campaign Finance, Ethics, and 
Lobbying Regulation" contains three integrated parts as 
identified in its title. Edward D. Feigenbaum served as chair 
of the committee and also edited the campaign finance portion 
of the act. John L. Larsen served as the editor of the ethics 
part and Betty J. Reynolds edited the lobbying section.
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the upper administration offices and elected officials. The 
cost of administration is thus reduced by requiring 
information from only those who hold positions that set 
administrative policy.
This legislation substantially modifies the model act's 
enforcement procedures. The enforcement portion of the 
legislation uses an existing administrative agency by 
assigning the duties of investigation and prosecution of 
conflict of interest violations to the Commissioner of 
Campaign Practices. This merely expands the duties of that 
agency and should result in a minimal fiscal impact. Every 
attempt to minimize fiscal impact is important to secure 
passage of the legislation. Legislation that includes a 
fiscal impact receives very close scrutiny and usually its 
passage is unlikely.
The legislation assigns adjudicatory and advisory opinion 
functions to an ethics commission. The legislature would 
appoint the membership of the commission in the same manner as 
the Legislative Reapportionment Commission. The separation 
of the prosecution from the adjudication would further insure 
fair and impartial treatment of the alleged violator. This 
would prevent a "star chamberatmosphere, where the same
133See Mont. Code Ann. § 5-1-102.
^^Ancient Britain used a "Star Chamber" to prosecute 
individuals. This procedure lacked major due process 
protection because of its structure and treatment of the 
defendants.
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agency serves as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury.
The legislation also contemplates punishing individuals 
making false complaints. Therefore, if an individual tries to 
use the enforcement process to falsely accuse somebody, then 
they may face a penalty. This should prevent political parties 
from using the process for harassment or political purposes.
The accused also has an opportunity to force a show cause 
hearing to make the prosecutor prove that enough evidence 
exists to continue the proceeding. This may prevent unfounded 
accusations and innuendoes from ruining a person's career. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the matter, the accused 
would have the option to make the proceedings either open or 
closed to the public. However, the results of the findings 
ultimately would become available for public inspection.
Finally, the proposed legislation incorporates the 
existing nepotism statutes. The existing Montana statutes 
address nepotism issues; however, they permit flexibility for 
quirks in the law peculiar to Montana. For example, under 
existing statutes, a sheriff may hire a relative to prepare 
meals for prisoners. This provision addresses the problem of 
finding employees in small towns.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PASSAGE 
This paper identified the difficulty of gaining passage 
of any meaningful conflict of interest legislation. As a 
result of the problem, someone must develop legislation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
through a consensus building process. It would require 
bringing all of the interest groups together prior to the 
session to recommend and review conflict of interest 
legislation. Such interest groups would include everyone from 
Common Cause to the people subject to the legislation.
The following process would provide the political 
groundwork necessary for the passage of the legislation.
The first step begins with building a coalition of interested 
parties to participate in the development of the conflict of 
interest legislation. That coalition should include
representatives from many interest groups including: elected 
officials, public employees, lobbyists, media reporters, 
political party officials, and public interest groups.
This group must first identify the problems the 
legislation should solve and then draft the legislation to 
solve those problems. This process would include researching 
what legislative solutions are used by other states and 
reviewing model legislation in order to determine the best 
approach for Montana. The group should then draft the 
legislation deemed appropriate for Montana. The diversity of 
the group may make it difficult to reach a consensus as to 
what issues need to be addressed and how. However, once the 
consensus is reached the participants can help sell the 
legislation to their respective groups.
The legislation drafting group should use model
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legislation as modified for Montana needs. By using the model 
laws as a starting point, the legislature should have a 
greater confidence in its contents. It would also insure a 
more consistent interpretation by the courts. The courts then 
can use established case law from other states that use the 
same language. This is consistent with the reasons for 
adoption of "uniform laws" throughout the country. The 
legislature tends to trust these uniform laws.
Once the legislation is drafted, it should be circulated 
to all interested parties for comments and recommendations. 
This will help identify the detractors. Additionally, the 
drafters of the legislation can deflect the detractors' 
criticism by finding ways to incorporate the suggestions or by 
being able to respond to objections. The group should also 
lobby the detractors to help them understand why it is in 
their interest to support the legislation. However, if they 
can't be converted, then the identification of the opponents 
will help in developing a game plan for the passage of the 
legislation in spite of their objection. Further, those who 
fail to respond to the request for comments will lose some of 
their credibility if they first raise their objections during 
the legislative process.
To make the passage of the legislation possible, it is
^̂ M̂any uniform law exist, such as the uniform commercial 
code, the Model Business act, the uniform probate code. These 
laws are drafted by Uniform Code Commissioners or the American 
Bar Association select committees.
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necessary to create a groundswe11 of supportive public 
opinion. The drafters of the legislation should seek public 
support for the legislation through press releases and 
opinion/editorial pieces. They should also seek opportunities 
to give speeches to business or civic groups, clubs or 
organizations. The focus should be to educate the public 
about conflict of interest problems and then to sell the 
proposed legislation as the solution to these problems. 
Throughout the process, the drafters should solicit, from 
outside the group, supporters to write letters to the editor 
or make comments on call-in radio shows.
The drafters of the legislation should seek to get public 
commitments from legislative candidates. The proposed draft 
legislation should be provided to candidates with a request 
for their support. If the legislation is properly drafted, 
then it will be difficult for candidates to publicly oppose 
the legislation. If a candidate does oppose or fails to 
support this legislation, then he or she most likely would 
receive criticism from the press and the public. This "on 
record" support for the legislation will be necessary to hold 
votes when behind-the-scenes opponents seek to kill the 
legislation. This process will remind legislative candidates 
and elected legislators why conflict of interest law reform is 
necessary.
Immediately after the election, the drafters should start
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planning how to obtain the passage of the legislation. They 
should identify the key legislative leaders who would be 
willing to sponsor this legislation. Emphasis should be given 
to finding both Democrat and Republican leaders from both 
houses to sponsor the bill. The drafters should lobby the 
leadership to send the legislation to favorable committees, 
or, at least, get their commitment to help marshall the 
legislation through.
It is also necessary to gain support form top state 
elected officials. The support of the Governor and the 
Attorney General may prove essential for the passage of the 
legislation. The governor serves as the leader of one 
political party and the top executive officer. The Attorney 
General, as the top legal officer, plays a key role in 
promoting proper standards of conduct. Therefore, they both 
must sign off on this legislation early in the process and be 
committed to being publicly identified as supporting the 
legislation.
Without the presence of some scandal to force the 
legislature to make the necessary reform, the likelihood of 
success may become problematic. However, passage is possible 
if the proponents of the reform legislation do the necessary 
work. Finally, should the legislation fail, then the 
initiative process should be pursued to obtain passage of the 
legislation.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it will be difficult to gain passage of 
meaningful and enforceable conflict of interest legislation. 
Its passage will not guarantee proper conduct of public 
officials, but it should provide appropriate treatment of 
those who violate the public trust. The press will always 
play a significant role in the process of maintaining 
integrity in government. Any conflict of interest
legislation must get support from as many sources as possible 
to assure passage.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX
A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED AN ACT TO GENERALLY REVISE THE 
ETHICS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, AND PERSONAL FINANCE DISCLOSURE 
LAWS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, AND REPEALING TITLE 1 
CHAPTER 2.
This shall be known as the Ethics, Conflict of Interest, 
and Personal Financial Disclosure Act.
§ 1 Intent and Purpose
The purpose of this act is to set forth an enforceable 
code of ethics prohibiting conflict between public duty and 
private interest as required by the constitution of Montana. 
The proper operation of democratic government requires that a 
public official or employee be independent and impartial; that 
government policy and decisions be made through the 
established processes of government; that a public official or 
employee not use public office to obtain private benefits; 
that a public official or employee avoid action which creates 
the appearance of using public office to obtain benefit; and 
that the public have confidence in the integrity of its 
government and public officials and employees.
§ 2 Definitions As used in this act, unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply: 
(1) "Anything of value" includes the following:
(a) A pecuniary item, including money, or a bank bill or
note.
(b) A promissory note, bill of exchange, order, draft,
60
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warrant, check, or bond given for the payment of money.
(c) A contract, agreement, promise, or other obligation 
for an advance, conveyance, forgiveness of indebtedness, 
deposit, distribution, loan, payment, gift, pledge, or 
transfer of money.
(d) A stock, bond, note, or other investment interest in 
an entity.
(e) A receipt given for the payment of money or other 
property.
(f) A right in action.
(g) A gift, tangible good, chattel, or an interest in a 
gift, tangible good, or chattel.
(h) A loan or forgiveness of indebtedness.
(i) A work of art, antique, or collectible.
(j) An automobile or other means of personal 
transportation.
(k) Real property or an interest in real property, 
including title to realty, a fee simple or partial interest, 
present or future, contingent or vested within reality, a 
leasehold interest, or other beneficial interest in realty.
(1) An honorarium or compensation for services.
(m) A rebate or discount in the price of anything of 
value unless the rebate or discount is made in the ordinary 
course of business to a member of the public without regard to 
that person's status as a public official or public employee, 
or the sale or trade of something for reasonable compensation
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that would ordinarily not be available to a member of the 
public.
(n) A promise or offer of employment.
(o) Any other thing of value that is pecuniary or
compensatory in value to a person.
(p) The agency may also promulgate rules and regulations 
defining additional things of value.
(q) "Anything of value " does not mean a campaign
contribution properly received and reported, if reportable, as 
required under the Campaign Finance Act.
(2) "Associated," when used with reference to an
organization, includes an organization in which an individual 
or a member of his or her immediate family is a director, 
officer, fiduciary, trustee, agent, or partner, or owns or
controls, in the aggregate, at least [should range from any 
interest at all to two (2) percent or a value of $5,000 or 
greater, in comport with the following definition] of the 
outstanding equity.
(3) "Business associate" includes the following:
(a) An employer.
(b) A general or limited partnership, or a general or 
limited partner within the partnership.
(c) A corporation:
(i)that is family-owned; or
(ii) in which all shares of stock are closely-held; 
or the shareholders, owners, or officers of the corporation.
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(d) A corporation in which the public official or 
employee, or other person subject to the Act:
(i) has an investment interest;
(ii) owns; or
(iii) has a beneficial interest in shares of stock 
which constitute more than:
(A) five percent (5%) of the value of the
corporation, or
(B) $1,000.
(e) A corporation, business association, or other 
business entity in which the public official or employee, or 
other person subject to the Act serves as an agent or a 
compensated representative.
(f) An association not otherwise covered by this 
definition between the public official or employee, or other 
person subject to the Act, and another person, which involves 
the conduct of a common enterprise.
(4) "Candidate" means an individual who seeks nomination 
or election to [state] office. An individual is a candidate 
when the individual:
(a) files a statement of candidacy or petition for 
nomination for office with the appropriate filing officer;
(b) is nominated for office by:
(i) a party at a primary;
(ii) nominating convention; or
(iii) petition for nomination;
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(c) solicits or receives and retains contributions, makes 
expenditures, or gives consent to an individual, organization, 
political party, or committee to solicit or receive and retain 
contributions or make expenditures to secure nomination or 
election to any office at any time, whether or not the office 
for which the individual will seek nomination or election is 
known when the :
(i) solicitation is made;
(ii) contribution is received and retained; or
(iii) expenditure is made; or
(d) is an officeholder who is subject of a recall
election.
(5) "Charitable organization" means an organization
identified in Title 35 Chapter 2 as a public benefit nonprofit 
corporation as it currently exists or as it may be amended.
(6) "Compensation" includes:
(1) an advance, conveyance, forgiveness of indebtedness, 
deposit, distribution, loan, payment, gift, pledge, or
transfer of money or anything of value ; or
(2) a contract, agreement, promise, or other obligation 
for an advance, conveyance, forgiveness of indebtedness, 
deposit, distribution, loan, payment, gift, pledge, or
transfer of money or anything of value, for services rendered 
or to be rendered.
(3) The term does not include reimbursement of expenses
if:
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(a) the reimbursement does not exceed the amount actually 
expended for the expenses; and
(b) it is substantiated by an itemization of expenses.
(7) "Consultant" means an individual other than a public 
official or public employee who contracts to:
(a) evaluate bids for public contracts; or
(b) award public contracts ;
for the state [or political subdivision].
(8) "Economic Interest" means an interest distinct from 
that of the general public in a state purchase, sale, lease, 
contract, option, or other transaction or arrangement 
involving property or services in which a public official or 
public employee may gain an economic benefit of fifty dollars 
($50) or more.
(9) "Family member" means an individual:
(a) who is the spouse, parent, sibling, child, mother-in- 
law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandparent, 
or grandchild; or
(b) is a member of the individual's household.
(10) "Filer" means an individual who is:
(a) a public official or who is nominated to be a public 
official;
(b) a public employee appointed by a public official;
(c) a candidate under the Campaign Finance Act;
(d) a public member; or
(e) a consultant.
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(11) (a) "Gift" means anything of value other than a 
contribution to a candidate as defined under the Campaign 
Finance Act in Section 13-1-101 to the extent that 
consideration of equal or greater value is not received. The 
term includes a rebate or discount in the price of anything of 
value unless the rebate or discount is made in the ordinary 
course of business to a member of the public without regard to 
that person's status as a candidate.
(b) The term does not include the following :
(i) Printed informational promotional material.
(ii) A gift that:
(A) is not used; and
(b) no later than thirty (30) days after receipt, is 
returned to the donor or delivered to a charitable 
organization and is not claimed as a charitable contribution 
for federal income tax purposes.
(iii) A gift, devise, or inheritance from an individual's 
spouse, child, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, parent- 
in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, aunt, 
uncle, or first cousin or the spouse of that individual, if 
the donor is not acting as the agent or intermediary for 
someone other than a person covered by this paragraph.
(d) A personalized plaque or trophy with a value that 
does not exceed one hundred and fifty dollars ($150).
(e) Food and beverage consumed on the occasion when 
participation in a charitable, civic, or community event which
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bears a relationship to the public official's or public 
employee's office and the official or employee is attending in 
an official capacity.
(12) "Immediate family" means an unemancipated child 
residing in a public official's or public employee's 
household, a spouse or significant other living at the same 
residence of a public official or public employee, or an 
individual claimed by the public official or public employee, 
or the public official's or public employee's spouse as a 
dependent for tax purposes.
(13) "Informal representation" means a contact, including 
a request for information, whether in person, by mail, or by 
telephone, made with a state or local agency official or 
employee on behalf of a client or constituent.
(14) "Judge" means an official who presides over a state, 
county, or municipal court or an administrative law hearings 
officer.
(15)(a) "Local entity" means a local or regional 
government office, department, division, bureau, board, or 
commission.
(b) The term does not include a court.
(16) "Negotiating" or "negotiate for employment" means a 
communication, directly or indirectly, with a prospective 
employer to discuss rendering services for compensation to 
that prospective employer.
(17) "Negotiation for employment" means the period that
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begins with a communication to a prospective employer to 
discuss rendering services for compensation to the prospective 
employer.
(18) "Official responsibility" means the direct 
administrative or operating authority, whether intermediate or 
final, and either exercisable alone or with others, and either 
personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or 
otherwise direct government action.
(19) "Participation" includes decision, approval, 
disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, or vote.
(20) "Particular matter" includes a judicial or other 
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other 
déterminât ion, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, 
charge, accusation, arrest, rulemaking, or legislation.
(21) "Person" means an individual, proprietorship, firm, 
partnership, joint venture, joint stock company, syndicate, 
business trust, estate, company, corporation, association, 
club, committee, organization, or group of person acting in 
concert.
(22) "Prime contractor" means a person who has entered 
into a public contract.
(23) "Prime contractor employee" means an officer, 
employee, or agent of a prime contractor.
(24) "Public contract" means a contractor for goods, 
services, or construction let by a unit of government.
(25) "Public employee" means an individual appointed to
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a position, including a person appointed to a position created 
by statute, whether compensated or not, in state [, county, or 
municipal] government, including members of the judiciary.
(26) "Public member" means a member appointed to a 
noncompensated part-time position on a board, commission, or 
council. A public member does not lose this status by 
receiving reimbursement of expenses or a per diem payment for 
services.
(27) (a) "Public official" means an individual elected to 
a state, district, county, or municipal office, or an 
individual who is appointed to fill a vacancy in the office, 
whether or not the individual has yet assumed the office. The 
term includes a member of the board of regents, commissioner 
of higher education, chancellor and vice chancellor or 
equivalent of the state university system, and a president of 
a state university.
(b) The term does not include a public member of an advisory 
board, commission, or council as defined in Section 2-15-122.
(28) "Remunerable activity" means a service for which a 
person receives payment in the form of a wage, salary, or 
other goods or services.
(29) "Representation" means an appearance before a state 
or local entity whether gratuitous or for compensation.
(30) "Sheltered market" has the meaning ascribed to it in 
Section 2 of the federal Minority and Female Business 
Enterprise Act as it currently exists and as it may be
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amended.
(31) (a) "State entity" means a state agency, office, 
department, division, bureau, board, commission, or council, 
including the legislature.
(b) The term does not include a court or an agency in the 
judicial branch.
(31) "Subcontract" means a contract or contractual action 
entered into by a prime contractor or subcontractor for 
obtaining goods or services under a prime contract.
(32) "Subcontract" means:
(a) a person, other than the prime contractor, who offers 
to furnish or furnishes goods or services under a prime 
contract or a subcontract entered into in connection with the 
prime contract ; and
(b) a person who offers to furnish or furnishes goods or 
services to the prime contractor or a higher tier 
subcontractor.
(33) "Subcontractor employee" means an officer, employee, 
or agent of a subcontractor.
(34) "Substantial value" means a monetary value of one 
hundred dollars ($100) or more, if a monetary value is 
ascertainable, or if a monetary value is not ascertainable, 
anything of more than nominal value.
(35) "Unit of state or local government" means the state 
or a unit or agency of state government; a county or municipal 
government or committee or an agency of county or municipal
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government; or any other entity funded by or expending tax 
dollars or the proceeds of publicly guaranteed bonds.
(36) "Unwarranted privilege" means a privilege, 
treatment, or advantage not available to others on an equal 
basis.
§ 3 Use of Title and Prestige of Public Office
(1) A public official or employee shall not receive 
anything of value for the private benefit of the official or 
employee or his or her immediate family or an organization 
with which the official is associated, unless the public 
official or public employee can show by clear and convincing 
evidence that :
(a) the thing of value was conveyed for a reason 
unrelated to and not arising from the recipient's holding or 
having held a public office or public position; and
(b) was unrelated to actions or matters before or 
affecting the government body of which the public official's 
or public employee's office or employment is a part.
(2) This provision does not apply to receipt of the 
following things of value:
(a) a certificate or plaque or commemorative token 
[of less than $150 value];
(b) informational promotional material; or
(c) education material [directly related to the 
public official or public employee's government duties].
5 4 Nepotism
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(1) A public official or public employee shall not 
advocate or cause the :
( A) employment;
(B) appointment;
(C) promotion;
(D) transfer; or
(E) advancement;
to an office or position of the state, county, municipality, 
or political subdivision], or supervise or manage a member of 
the public official or public employee's household or family 
member or any person related or connected by consanguinity 
within the fourth degree or by affinity with the second 
degree.
(2) A public official or public employee shall not 
participate in an action relating to the employment or 
discipline of a member of the public official's or public 
employee's household or a family member.
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) do not apply to:
(a) a sheriff in the appointment of a person as a cook or 
an attendant;
(b) school district trustees if all the trustees, with 
the exception of any trustee who is related to the person 
being appointed and who must abstain from voting for the 
appointment, approve the appointment of a person related to a 
trustee;
(c) a school district in the employment of a person as a
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substitute teacher who is not employed as a substitute teacher 
for more than 30 consecutive school days; or
(d) the renewal of an employment contract of a person who 
was initially hired before the member of the board, bureau or 
commission or the department head to whom he is related 
assumed the duties of the office.
§ 5 Misuse of Office
(1) A public official or employee shall not use public 
funds, time, personnel, facilities, or equipment for the 
official or employee's private gain or that of another unless 
the use is authorized by law.
(2) A public official or public employee shall not use 
public funds, time, personnel, facilities, or equipment for 
political or campaign activity unless the use is:
(A) authorized by law; or
(B) properly incidental to another activity required 
or authorized by law.
(3) The agency may adopt rules specifying examples of 
political or campaign activity permissible or not permissible 
under this section.
§ 6 Representation by Public Officials and Public Employees
(1) (a) A state elective official other than a legislator 
shall not represent another person before a state or local 
entity, except as required by statute.
(b) A legislator or members of his firm or business shall 
not represent another person before a state entity, other than
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a court.
(d) A public official shall not represent another person 
before an entity of the same political subdivision which the 
public official serves, except as required by statute.
(e) A public official or public employee shall not
represent another person before the entity the public official 
or public employee serves.
(f) A public employee of a bureau chief level or higher 
receiving compensation other than reimbursement or per diem 
payments for the public employee's official duties shall not 
represent another person before an entity of the same
political division including a court.
(g) These restrictions do not apply to the following:
(i) Purely ministerial matters do not require
discretion on the part of the entity.
(ii) Representation by a public official or public 
employee in the course of the official or employee's official 
duties.
(iii) Representation of the public official or
public employee in the official or employee's personal
capacity.
(iv) Representation by an attorney who is a public
official or a public employee before a court when such
representation is not otherwise prohibited by applicable codes 
of attorney or judicial conduct.
(2) The restrictions set forth in this section do not
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apply if the former public official or former public employee 
is :
(a) testifying under oath to facts that are within 
the individual's knowledge, or as an expert witness who does 
not accept compensation other than regularly provided for by 
law, or rule for subpoenaed witnesses; or
(b) an elected representative of the federal 
government, or a local government within the state, or whose 
principal occupation or employment is with the federal 
government or a local government, and the appearance, 
communication, assistance, or representation is on behalf of 
the government.
§ 7 Votes, Deliberations, and Discussions
(1) A public official or public employee shall not 
participate in, vote on, influence, or attempt to influence an 
official decision if the public official or public employee or 
a business or organization with which the public official or 
public employee is associated has:
(a) a pecuniary interest in; or
(b) a reasonably foreseeable benefit from;
the matter under consideration by the governmental entity of 
which the public official or public employee is a member. A 
potential benefit includes detriment to a business competitor 
to the public official or public employee or business or 
organization with which the public official or public employee 
is associated.
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(2) Except as permitted in subsection (3) , a public 
official described by this subdivision but not exempt shall 
abstain from participation in the discussion and vote on the 
decision. The public official's abstention must be recorded 
in the governmental entity's minutes.
(3) A public official or public employee may participate 
in, vote on, or influence or attempt to influence an official 
decision if the only pecuniary interest or reasonably 
foreseeable benefit that may accrue to the public official or 
public employee is incidental to the pubic official's or 
public employee's position, or which accrues to the public 
official or public employee as a member of a profession, 
occupation, or large class, to no greater extent than the 
pecuniary interest or potential benefit could reasonably be 
foreseen to accrue to all other members of the profession, 
occupation, or large class.
(4) The restrictions of this section apply to a business 
or organization with which a family member of a public 
official or employee is associated if the family member's 
pecuniary interest or a business or organization with which a 
family member is associated has a reasonably foreseeable 
benefit from a matter under consideration.
(5) No member of the legislature during his term of 
office may be associated with a business or firm which 
actively lobbies the legislature or represents clients before 
state agencies.
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(6) A member of the Legislature, may not vote on the 
section of that year's general appropriation bill relating to 
a particular agency or commission if the member is employed by 
that agency or, an individual with whom he is associated, or 
a business with which he is associated has represented any 
clients before that agency or commission within one year prior 
to such vote. This subsection does not prohibit a member from 
voting on other sections of the general appropriation bill or 
from voting on the general appropriation bill as a whole.
§ 8 Restraints on Solicitation or Acceptance of Gifts and 
Gratuities
(1) A person shall not, directly or indirectly, give, 
offer, or promise anything of value to:
(a) a public official or public employee; or
(b) a person who has been elected or selected to be 
a public official or public employee; with the intent to:
(i) influence an official act ;
(ii) influence a public official or public 
employee, or individual who has been selected to be a public 
official or public employee, to commit, aid in committing, 
collude in, or allow fraud on a state, county, or municipal 
entity; or
(iii) induce a public official or public 
employee, or individual who has been selected to be a public 
official or public employee, to perform or fail to perform an 
act in violation of the public official or public employee's
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lawful duty.
(2) A public official or employee, or individual who has 
been elected or selected to be a public official or public 
employee, shall not, directly or indirectly, ask, demand, 
exact, solicit, seek, accept, assign, receive, or agree to 
receive anything of value for the public official or employee, 
or individual who has been selected to be a public official or 
public employee, or for any other person or entity, in return 
for being:
(a) influenced in the performance of an official
act ;
(b) influenced to commit, aid in committing, collude 
in, allow fraud, or make an opportunity for the commission of 
fraud on a state, county, or municipal governmental entity; or
(c) induced to perform or fail to perform an act in 
violation of the public official or public employee's official 
duty.
(3) A person shall not, directly or indirectly, give, 
offer, or promise to give anything of value to another person 
or entity, with intent to influence testimony under oath or 
affirmation in a trial or other proceeding before :
(a) a court;
(b) a committee or either house or both houses of 
the legislature; or
(c) an agency, commission, or officer authorized to 
hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence
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a witness to fail to appear.
(4) A person shall not, directly or indirectly, ask, 
demand, exact, solicit, seek, accept, assign, receive, or 
agree to receive anything of value in return for influencing 
testimony under oath or affirmation in a trial or other 
proceeding before;
(a) a court;
(b) a committee or either house or both houses of 
the legislature; or
(c) an agency, commission, or officer authorized to 
hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence 
a witness to fail to appear.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not prohibit the payment 
or receipt of witness fees provided by law or the payment by 
the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by 
a witness of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence at 
a trial, hearing, or proceeding, or, in the case of an expert 
witness involving a technical or professional opinion, a 
reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of the 
opinion, and in appearing or testifying.
§ 9 Private Interests by a Public Official or Public Employee 
in Public Contracts
(1) A public official or public employee may not have an 
interest in a public contract if the public official or public 
employee is authorized to perform an official function 
relating to the contract requiring the exercise of discretion.
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(2) A public official or public employee may not have an 
interest in a public contract if the public official or public 
employee or a family member of a public official or public 
employee or a business or organization with which the official 
is associated has a substantial financial interest.
§ 10 Actions Taken While Negotiating for Employment
A public official or public employee may not act or fail 
to take action in a matter affecting a person with whom the 
public official or public employee is negotiating for 
employment.
§ 11 Representation of Clients After Government Service
(1) A former public official or former public employee 
may not represent a person in a matter before a government 
entity in which the former public official or former public 
employee participated personally and substantially while a 
public official or public employee.
(2) A former public official or former public employee 
may not represent a person in a matter which was pending under 
the former public official's or former public employee's 
official responsibility within one (1) year before the 
termination of that responsibility for one (1) year after the 
former public official's or former public employee's service 
in the public position has ceased.
<3) A former public official or former public employee 
may not represent a person in a matter before the government 
entity which the former public official or former public
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employee served for a period of one (1) year after the former 
public official's or former public employee's employment has 
ceased.
(4) A former public official may not register as a
lobbyist or lobbyist's principal, other than for a government 
entity, for a period of one (1) year after the latter of:
(A) the date of leaving office; or
(B) the date the term of office to which the public 
official was elected expires.
§ 12 Blind Trusts
(a) A public official or public employee who has direct, 
indirect, or beneficial interest in a blind trust which meets 
the standards set forth below is not required to disclose the 
pro rata share of interests in real property or investments, 
or income deriving from such interests or investments, if 
those interests are acquired by the trustee after the trust 
complies with subsection (b).
(b) A blind trust must comply with the following
conditions :
(1) the trustee must be:
(a) a disinterested party other than the public 
official or employee's spouse, child, parent, grandparent, 
grandchild, brother, sister, parent- in-law, brother-in-law, 
sister-in-law, aunt, uncle, first cousin, or the spouse of any 
such person;
(b) someone who is not a public official or
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public employee; and
(c) someone who has not been appointed to a 
public entity by the public official or public employee, or by 
a public official or public employee supervised by the filer.
(2) the trustee must be given complete discretion to 
manage the trust, including, but not limited to, the power to 
dispose of and acquire trust assets without consulting or 
notifying the filer.
(3) the trustee must be required to notify the filer of 
the date of disposition and value at disposition of any 
original investments or interests in real property so that 
information can be reported on the filer's personal financial 
disclosure statement.
(4) the trustee must be prohibited from disclosing to the 
filer any information concerning the replacement assets except 
for information required under this subsection or the minimum 
tax information which lists only the totals of taxable items 
from the trust and does not describe the source of individual 
items of income.
(5) a copy of the trust agreement must be filed with the 
Agency within five (5) business days after execution, 
including:
(a) an identification of the assets placed in trust;
(b) a statement detailing the date of its creation, 
and the name and address of the trustee; and
(c) a statement signed by the trustee, under penalty
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of perjury, stating that he or she has not revealed any
information to the filer, except that which is permitted under 
this section, and that, to the best of the trustee's 
knowledge, the trust is in compliance with this section.
(6) (i) if the trust is revoked while the filer is a
public official or public employee, or if the filer learns of 
any replacement assets of the trust, the filer must file an 
amendment to the most recent statement of personal financial 
disclosure disclosing the date of revocation and the 
previously unreported pro rata share of the trust's interests 
in real property or investments or income deriving from any 
such interests in real property or investments, and disqualify 
himself or herself as necessary.
(ii) For purposes of this section, any replacement 
of assets of which the filer learns shall thereafter be
treated as though they were original assets of the trust.
S 13 Personal Financial Disclosure
(1) Exception to Reporting Requirements.
This section does not require the disclosure of financial 
information concerning the following:
(a) A spouse legally separated from the public 
official or public employee.
(b) A former spouse.
(c) A gift from a family member.
(d) A campaign contribution that is permitted and 
reported under [the Campaign Finance Act], if required.
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(2) Individuals Required to File.
The following individuals shall file a statement of 
financial interests with the agency:
(a) A public official or public employee who is an 
exempt employee or classified grade 18 or higher.
(b) An individual nominated to become a public 
official or public employee.
(c) An individual who is a candidate to become a 
public official.
(d) A public member.
(e) A consultant.
(3) Deadline for Filing Statements
The statement of financial interest must be filed for the 
preceding year no later than April 30 of each year, complete 
through December 31 of the preceding year, except;
(a) In the case of an individual nominated to be a public 
official, public member, or public employee, no later than 21 
(twenty-one) days after the nomination.
(b) In the case of a candidate to become a public 
official, at the time of filing for public office.
(c) In the case of a public employee employed after 
January 1, the later of April 30 or 21 days after employment.
(4) Filing Entity for Consultant Statements
A consultant shall file a statement of economic interests 
no later than twenty-one (21) days after entering into a 
contractual relationship with the state or a political
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subdivision if the consultant, or member of the household of 
the consultant has an economic interest in an entity:
(a) whose bid was evaluated by the consultant and who was 
subsequently awarded the contract by the state or the 
political subdivision that contracted with the consultant; or
(b) who was awarded a contract by the consultant.
(5) Amounts to be Reported.
(a) Where an amount is reported, a filer must report 
information in the following category amounts unless otherwise 
indicated:
(i) $1,000 - $9,999
(ii) $10,000 - $24,999
(iii) $25,000 - $49,999
(iv) $50,000 - $99,999
(v) $100,000 - $149,000
(vi) $150,000 - $249,000
(vii) $250,000 - $499,000
(viii) $500,000 - $999,999
(ix) $1,000,000 and above
§ 14 Agency Handling Disclosure of Statements
(1) The Agency may grant a reasonable extension of time 
for filing a statement of financial interests. The extension 
may not exceed thirty (30) days, except in cases of illness or 
incapacitation.
(2) A statement of financial interests becomes a public 
record available for copying when received by the Agency. A
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statement may be reviewed and copied at the office of the 
Agency during ordinary business hours.
(3) A statement of financial interests must be retained 
by the Agency for a period of five (5) years after filing in 
a form, including microfilming, that will facilitate document 
retention, except that:
(a) Upon the expiration of three (3) years after an 
individual ceases to be a public official, the Agency shall, 
unless the former public official otherwise requests, destroy 
any statements of financial interests or copies of such 
statements filed by the former public official and any copies 
in the possession of the Agency.
(b) Upon the expiration of three years after any 
election at which a candidate for election as a pubic official 
was not elected, or a nominee for a public office or public 
employee is not confirmed in the position, the Agency shall 
destroy any statements of financial interests or copies of 
such statements filed by him or her as a candidate,
(i) unless the individual is otherwise required 
to file a statement; or
(ii) unless the individual otherwise requests. 
§ 15 Information Required
(1) A Statement of financial interests must contain full 
and complete information concerning the following:
(a) The name, business or governmental address, and 
work place telephone number of the filer.
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(b) The source, type, and amount or value of income 
received from a governmental entity by the filer and the 
filer's spouse and dependents.
(c) The source, type, and amount of income in cash 
or in-kind received by the filer and the filer's spouse, and 
dependents.
(d) The source, payee, type, date, and exact amount 
of gifts, including food, lodging, or entertainment:
(i) received by a filer and a filer's spouse 
and dependents ; and
(ii) in excess of five hundred dollars ($500) 
in a calendar year.
(e) The source, payee, type, date, and exact amount 
of anything of value received from a lobbyist, lobbyist's 
principal, including a notation of the word "lobbyist" to 
identify gifts received by the filer, or filer's spouse and 
dependents from a person engaged in lobbying activities or any 
lobbyist organization.
(f) (i) The description (commercial, residential, or 
rural), value, and location of all real property owned during 
the calendar year by a public official, public employee, or 
consultant, and the official's or employee's immediate family 
members, and the same information for options to purchase such 
real property;
(ii) the amount received from the sale, lease, or 
rental of real property; the name of the person that payment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
was received from; and
(iii) an identification of all commercial tenants, 
lobbyists, and lobbyist's principals (but not individuals who 
are not lobbyists or lobbyist's principals) from which income 
of [$1,000 or more] including rent or purchase money was 
derived during the reporting period.
If the sale, lease, or rental of real property involves a 
state, county, or municipal instrumentality of government, a 
copy of the contract, lease, or rental agreement must be
attached to the statement of financial interests.
(g) The description, location, and amount of payment
received from the sale, lease, or rental of personal property
during the preceding calendar year by a public official, or 
public employee, and the official's or employee's immediate 
family members, and an identification of all lobbyists and 
lobbyist's principals from which income of $250 or more was 
derived during the reporting period.
If the sale, lease, or rental of personal property involves a 
state, county, or municipal instrumentality of government, a 
copy of the contract, lease, or rental agreement must be
attached to the statement of financial interests.
(h) The identity of every business or entity in which the 
public official or public employee, or a family member of the 
public official or public employee held securities valued at 
$1,000 or more during the reporting period.
(i) A listing by name and address of:
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(i) each creditor to whom the public official, 
public employee, or consultant, and the official or employee 
or consultant's immediate family members owed a debt in excess 
of five hundred dollars ($500) at any time during the calendar 
year, other than for a credit card or retail installment 
contract, and the original amount of the debt and amount 
outstanding; and
(ii) the rate of interest charged the public 
official, public employee, or consultant, and the official or 
employee or consultant's immediate family members.
If a discharge of the debt has been made, the date of the 
transaction must be shown.
(j) The amount and listing by name and address of all 
clients represented by the public official, public employee, 
or consultant, and the official's or employee's immediate 
family members before a state, county, or municipal regulatory 
Agency for a fee, reward, gift, or other compensation in 
excess of $250 during the preceding calendar year.
(k) Every officership, directorship, trusteeship, or 
other fiduciary relationship held in a business during the 
disclosure period, the term of office, and the annual 
compensation
(1) The amount and identity of every creditor interest in 
an insolvent business held during the disclosure period having 
a value of five hundred dollars ($500) or more.
(m) The amount of every loan made to someone by the
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public official or public employee and their immediate family 
members in an amount of five hundred dollars ($500) or more, 
the original amount of the loan and amount outstanding, rate 
of interest, payment schedule, and the name and address of the 
person to whom the loan was made.
(n) State professional or occupation permits or licenses
held.
(0) The name of a lobbyist who is:
(i) an immediate family member of the public 
official or employee;
(ii) a partner of the public official or employee or 
of an immediate family member;
(iii) an officer or director of the public official 
or public employee's employer, or employer of the public 
official or public employee or an immediate family member; or
(iv) a business associate of a public official or 
public employee or member of the public official's or public 
employee's immediate family.
(2) The information shall be filed on a form prescribed 
by the Agency.
S 16 Technical Violations of Disclosure Requirement
(1) The Agency may , in its discretion, determine that 
errors or omissions on statement of economic interests are 
inadvertent and unintentional and not an effort to violate a 
requirement of this act and may be handled as technical 
violations not subject to the provisions of this act
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pertaining to violations. Technical violations must remain 
confidential unless requested to be made public by the person 
filing the statement. In lieu of all other penalties the 
agency my assess a technical violations penalty not exceeding 
fifty dollars.
§ 17 Establishment and Composition of the Agency
(1) The Agency is established as an independent 
authority.
(2) The Agency consists of five (5) members. The members 
are appointed in the same manner as proscribed in Section 5-1- 
102. A member of the Agency must be a citizen of the United 
States and resident of this state. A member of the Agency 
shall not be a:
(A) pubic official;
(B) public employee; or
(C) candidate;
(D) lobbyist or lobbyist's principal;
or a member of the immediate family of such an individual 
while a member of the Agency.
(3) A member of the Agency serves a term of four (4) 
years. However, the initial members of the Agency serve the 
following terms:
(A) One (1) member serves a term of one (1) year.
(B) One (1) member serves a term of two (2) years.
(C) One (1) member serves a term of three (3) years.
(D) Two (2) members serve a term of four (4) years.
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(4) An individual may not serve more than two (2) 
consecutive term as a member of the Agency. A member of the 
Agency continues in office until a successor is appointed and 
has qualified.
(5) (a) In the event a reappointment or vacancy occurs 
on the agency, the appointing authority of the seat needing an 
appointment shall designate a successor.
(b) In the event the appointing authority at the time a 
vacancy occurs is of the opposite political party than that of 
the appointing authority that made the appointment that is 
vacant, the majority or minority leader in the same house of 
the same political party as the appointing authority that made 
the original appointment of the commissioner whose position is 
vacated shall designate the successor.
§ 2 Election and Duties of the Chair and Vice Chair
The chair and vice chair of the Agency are elected by a 
majority of the members of the Agency. The chair and vice 
chair serve a term of one (1) year, and may be re-elected. 
The chair presides at meetings of the Agency. The vice chair 
presides in the absence or disability of the chair.
§ 18 Agency Meetings
The Agency meets at the call of the chair or a majority 
of its members. A quorum consists of three (3) or more 
members. An affirmative vote of three (3) or more members is 
necessary for an Agency action.
§ 19 Filling of a Vacancy
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A vacancy is filled for the remainder of an unexpired 
term in the same manners as an original appointment, except 
that the chief justice of the [state court of last resort] 
shall nominate two (2) individuals for gubernatorial 
appointment to a vacancy.
§ 2 0 Removal of a Member
(1) The governor may remove or suspend a member of the 
Agency upon filing with the Agency a written finding of the 
member's misfeasance or malfeasance, and upon serving a copy 
of the written finding on the member removed or suspended.
(2) The removal or suspension may be appealed 
immediately to the first district court and may take 
precedence over all other matters pending before the court.
§ 21 Expenses for Agency Members
(1) A member of the Agency serves without compensation, 
but is afforded actual and necessary expenses incurred in the 
performance of duties.
§ 22 Agency Staff
(1) The Agency may employ and remove at its pleasure an 
executive director to perform its functions. The executive 
director shall have the responsibility for employing and 
removing other personnel as may be necessary.
(2) An executive director shall administer the daily 
business of the Agency, and perform the duties assigned by the 
Agency.
(3) The Agency shall fix the compensation of its
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employees. The staff of the Agency is outside of the 
statewide classification pay schedule. A member of the staff 
of the Agency shall not be:
(A) a public official; or
(B) a candidate;
while a member of the staff of the Agency.
§500.08 Filing of Statement of Financial Disclosure
A member and an employee of the Agency shall file a 
statement of financial disclosure with the Agency which shall 
be a public record.
§ 23 Prohibition on Political Activity by Agency Members and 
Staff
(1) A member of the Agency and its staff shall not 
participate in political management or in a political caimpaign 
during the member or employee's term of office or employment. 
A member of the Agency and its staff shall not:
(a) make a financial contribution to a candidate;
(b) make a financial contribution to a political 
committee; or
(c) knowingly attend a fundraiser held for the 
benefit of a candidate or political committee.
S 24 Prohibition on Lobbying Activity by Agency Members and 
Staff
(1) A member of the Agency and its staff may not be a 
registered lobbyist or participate in lobbying activities that 
would require the individual to register as a lobbyist, unless
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the lobbyist activities are:
(a) authorized by the Agency;
(b) conducted on behalf of the Agency; and
(c) permitted under state law.
S 25 Agency Authority and General Powers
(1) Except as expressly provided otherwise, the Agency 
is responsible for administering the provisions of this 
chapter. The Agency shall have the power and duties set forth 
in this Act.
§ 26 Advisory Opinions
(1) The agency may render advisory opinions concerning 
this Act based upon real or hypothetical circumstances, when 
requested in writing by:
(a) a public official or public employee;
(b) a former public official or former public 
employee; or
(c) a person who is personally and directly involved 
in the matter.
(2) An advisory opinion request by a public official or 
public employee concerning his or her own affairs or the 
affairs of a subordinate public official or employee or 
potential public official or public employee shall be 
confidential.
(3) An advisory opinion request by a former public 
official or former public employee concerning his or her own 
affairs shall be confidential.
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(4) An advisory opinion request by a person concerning 
his or her own affairs with regard to potential public service 
shall be confidential.
(5) An advisory opinion shall be in writing and must be 
made available to the public, but in the case of confidential 
advisory opinion, the identity of the person requesting the 
opinion and of a person whose affairs are involved in the 
circumstances described in the request for the advisory 
opinion, are confidential.
(6) An advisory opinion shall be deemed rendered when 
signed by three or more Agency members subscribing to the 
advisory opinion.
(7) An Agency member who agrees with the advisory opinion 
but for different reasons than as stated may file a written 
concurring opinion.
(8) An Agency member who disagrees with the advisory 
opinion may file a written dissenting opinion, which will be 
placed at the end of the majority opinion, or at the end of a 
concurring opinion, if any.
(9) Agency attorneys may issue advice either orally or in 
writing concerning this Act based upon real or hypothetical 
circumstances when requested when such advice is consistent 
with this Act or previous advisory opinions issued by the 
Agency, provided that such advice shall be confidential when 
an advisory opinion on the matter would be confidential. 
Advice so issued by Agency attorneys need not be made
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available to the public.
(10) An advisory opinion requested under this section and 
any related internal Agency materials requested or prepared as 
a result of such an advisory opinion request shall be 
confidential.
(11) The confidentiality of an advisory opinion may be 
waived either:
(A) in writing, by the person who requested the 
advisory opinion; or
(B) by majority vote of the members of the Agency, 
if a person makes or purports to make public the substance or 
any portion of an advisory opinion requested by or on behalf 
of the person. The Agency, may in such an event, also vote to 
make public the advisory opinion request and related 
materials.
§ 27 Conduct of Investigations
(1) The Commissioner of Campaign Practices may conduct 
investigations, inquiries, and hearings concerning any matter 
covered by this Act and certify its own acts and records.
(2) The Commissioner may determine whether to:
(A) investigate; and
(B) act upon a complaint.
(3) When the Commissioner determines that assistance is 
needed in conducting investigations, or when required by law, 
the Commissioner shall request the assistance of other 
appropriate agencies.
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S 28 Adoption of Rules
The Agency shall adopt, amend, repeal, and enforce rules 
to implement this Act.
§ 29 Prescription of Forms and Preservation of Documents
The Agency shall prescribe and provide forms for reports, 
statements, notices, and other documents required by this Act. 
Documents filed with the Agency as public records must be 
retained for at least four (4) years from the date of their 
receipt.
S 3 0 Review of Statements
(1) The Commissioner of Campaign Practices shall:
(a) review each statement filed in accordance with 
this Act for compliance with its provisions ; and
(b) notify the individual on whose behalf the 
statement is filed of an omission or deficiency.
§ 31 Access to Statements
(1) The Commissioner of Campaign Practices shall make 
statements and reports filed with the Agency available upon 
the written request of an individual for public inspection and 
copying during regular office hours. The Agency shall make 
copying facilities available free of charge or at a cost not 
to exceed actual cost. A statement may be requested by mail, 
and the Agency shall mail a copy of the requested statement to 
the individual making the request upon payment of appropriate 
postage costs-
§502.08 Maintenance of Statements
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(2) The Agency shall compile and maintain an index of 
reports and statements filed with the Agency to facilitate 
public access to the reports and statements.
§ 32 Access to Information for Investigations
(1) The Commissioner may require the cooperation of a 
state agency, official, employee, and other person whose 
conduct is regulated by this Act. An individual shall make 
information reasonably related to an investigation available 
to the Agency on written request.
§ 33 Annual Report of the Agency
No later than January l of each year, the Agency shall 
report to the legislature and the governor on the Agency's 
activities in the preceding year. The report must contain the 
names and duties of each individual employed by the Agency, 
and a summary of Agency determinations and advisory opinions. 
The Agency shall prevent disclosure of the identity of a 
person involved in [decisions or] confidential advisory 
opinions. The report may contain other information oh matters 
within the Agency's jurisdiction and recommendations for 
legislation as the Agency deems desirable.
S 34 Publication of Information
(1) The Agency shall publish and make available to the 
persons subject to this Act and the public explanatory 
information concerning this Act, the duties imposed by it, and 
the means for enforcing it.
§ 35 Research and Education Outreach
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(1) The Agency may:
(a) conduct research concerning state governmental 
ethics; and
(b) implement the educational programs it considers 
necessary to effectuate this Act.
§ 36 Oaths and Subpoenas 
(1) The Agency May:
(a) administer oaths and affirmations for testimony 
of witnesses; and
(b) issue subpoenas by a vote of three or more 
members, subject to judicial enforcement, for the procurement 
of witnesses and materials relevant to the Commissioners 
investigations, including books, papers, records, documents, 
or other tangible objects.
§ 37 Local Rules
(1) The Agency shall issue rules governing state 
government campaign finance, conflicts of interest, financial 
disclosure, and lobbyist regulation. The rules may be adopted 
by a local jurisdiction or imposed upon a local jurisdiction 
under this Act.
§ 38 Other Duties
(1) The Agency may perform the other acts, duties, and 
functions authorized by this Act that it deems appropriate in 
connection with this Act.
§ 39 Complaints
(1) The Commissioner shall accept from an individual.
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either personally or on behalf of an organization or 
governmental body, a verified complaint in writing that states 
the name of a person alleged to have committed a violation of 
this Act, and sets forth the particulars of the violation.
(2) The Commissioner shall forward a copy of the 
complaint and a general statement of the applicable law with 
respect to the complaint to the respondent.
(3) If the Commissioner determines that the complaint 
does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a violation of 
the Act, it shall dismiss the complaint and notify the 
complainant and the respondent. If the Commissioner 
determines that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to 
constitute a violation of the Act, an investigation may be 
conducted with respect to an alleged violation.
(4) If the Commissioner determines that information he 
has received:
(a) provides an adequate basis for the belief that 
a violation of the Act has been committed; or
(b) that an investigation of a possible violation is
warranted;
an investigation may be conducted with respect to an alleged 
violation.
(5) If the Commissioner, during the course of an 
investigation, or upon the receipt of information finds 
probable cause to believe that a violation of the Act has 
occurred, it may, upon its own motion, make a complaint in
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writing, stating the name of the person who is alleged to have 
committed the violation of the Act, and set forth the 
particulars thereof. A complaint initiated by the Agency must 
be signed by a majority of the members of the Agency.
(6) The Agency shall forward a copy of the complaint, and 
a general statement of the applicable laws with respect to the 
complaint to the respondent.
§ 40 Amendment of Conqplaints
(1) If a verified complaint has been filed, or if the 
Commissioner has issued its own complaint, and subsequently 
the Agency finds probable cause to believe that a violation of 
the Act has occurred, other than an alleged violation in the 
complaint, the Commissioner may amend the complaint upon his 
own motion to include the violation.
(2) An amended complaint issued by the Commissioner must 
be signed by a majority of the members of Agency. The 
Commissioner shall forward a copy of the amended complaint, 
and a general statement of the applicable laws with respect to 
the amended complaint to the complainant and respondent.
S 41 Right to Appear
(1) The Agency shall afford a public official or employee 
who is subject of a complaint an opportunity at a preliminary 
hearing to explain the conduct alleged to be in violation of 
the Act. A public official or employee who is the subject of 
a complaint has the right to appear and be heard under oath 
and to offer information which may tend to exonerate the
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public official or employee of probable cause to believe that 
there has been a violation of the Act.
(2) Unless requested otherwise by the respondent this 
hearing shall not be open to the public.
§ 42 Right to Request an Investigation of One's Own Conduct
(1) A public official or employee may request the 
Commissioner of Campaign Practices to make an investigation of 
the public official's or employee's own conduct, or of 
allegations made by another individual as to the public 
official or employee's conduct. This request must be in 
writing and set forth in detail the reasons for requesting an 
investigation.
§ 43 Statute of limitations
(1) Action may not be taken on a complaint filed more 
than three (3) years after the violation of the Act is alleged 
to have occurred.
(2) Nothing herein shall bar proceedings against a 
person who by fraud or other device prevents discovery of a 
violation of the act.
§ 44 Referral of Evidence of a Violation of Law
(1) Notwithstanding of the provisions of confidentiality 
of investigations, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, 
turn over to an appropriate government agency upon request or 
as a matter of course, apparent evidence of a violation of 
law.
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S 45 Authorization to Conduct an Investigation
(1) Before the Commissioner may subpoena a witness, 
administer oaths, take testimony, or require the production 
for examination of books or papers with respect to an 
investigation or hearing he shall fill a notice of a complaint 
with the agency which shall define the nature and scope of his 
inquiry.
(2) The agency may quash or limit the scope of the 
investigation after a proceeding specified in Section 32 upon 
a showing that there exists no basis for a complaint and that 
the matter is frivolous.
(3) At the conclusion of the investigation if the 
Commissioner determines through the investigation that 
probable cause exists to believe that a violation of the act 
has occurred then he shall issue a notice to appear before the 
agency, setting forth;
(a) Finding of facts and conclusions of law that 
demonstrate probable cause exists to believe that a violation 
of the act has occurred.
(b) The date, time, and place the hearing before the 
Agency will take place pursuant to the provisions in MAPA.
(c) The possible penalties or sanctions that may be 
imposed against the respondent in the event the Agency finds 
a violation of the Act occurred.
(4) In the event the Commissioner determines that no 
probable cause exists to prosecute the respondent then he
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shall file a written notice of no probable cause and his 
finding and conclusions with the agency.
(5) If the Commissioner finds probable cause to believe 
that a violation of the act has occurred the Commissioner may 
waive further proceedings because of action the respondent 
takes to remedy or correct the alleged violation which may 
including the payment of fines or acceptance of other 
sanctions. The Agency must issue an order which approves the 
remedial or corrective action taken by the respondent, the 
Commissioners decision in light of the action to waive further 
proceedings, and the Commissioner's justification for his 
decision which will then become part of the public record.
(a) If the Agency refused to approve the settlement of 
the matter then the Commissioner shall issue a notice of 
hearing pursuant to subsection (3).
(6) The Commissioner at the end of his investigation may 
initiate an action against a complainant if the allegations 
made by the complainant prove to be frivolous, or groundless 
and are made recklessly or maliciously. Proceedings under 
such action shall be made in accordance with section 37 the 
agency could order the complainant to pay civil penalties up 
to $1,000 plus pay to the respondent an amount equal to the 
expenses incurred by the respondent for attorney fees and 
other expenses related to the investigation of the complaint. 
§ 46 Hearing procedures
(1) The agency shall conduct a hearing pursuant to the
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provisions of MAPA with the exception that if a hearings 
examiner is appointed he must :
(a) be a licensed attorney in the state of Montana;
(b) not be an elective official or full-time employee of 
the executive or legislative branch; and
(c) not be a member or employee of the Agency or 
Commissioner.
(2) The Commissioner or his designee shall prosecute the 
case before the agency.
(3) The respondent shall have the full rights granted 
under the adverse hearing proceeding specified in MAPA.
(4) After the conclusion of its hearing, the Agency 
shall, as soon as practicable;
(a) begin deliberations on the evidence presented at the 
hearing; and
(b) determine whether the respondent has violated the
act.
(5) If a hearing officer is appointed and a majority of 
the members of the Agency are not present at the hearing the 
Agency shall not begin deliberations until after:
(a) the proposed decision prepared by the hearings 
officer is served upon the Agency and the parties; and
(b) an opportunity is provided for oral arguments.
§ 47 Orders and Recommendations
(1) No later than 12 0 days after the conclusion of a 
hearing to determine whether a violation of the act has
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occurred, the Agency shall set forth its determination in a 
written decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The Agency shall sent its written decision with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to the respondent and complainant 
and Commissioner.
(2) If the Agency determines that a violation of the Act 
has occurred, its written decision with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law must contain one (1) or more of the 
following orders or recommendations:
(A) In the case of a state official liable to 
impeachment, a recommendation to the presiding officer of each 
chamber of the legislature that the official be removed from 
office.
(B) In the case of a public official or public 
employee in the [classified or unclassified] service, a 
recommendation to the appropriate appointing authority that 
the public official or public employee be censured, suspended, 
or removed from office or employment.
(C) In the case of a member of the state 
legislature, a recommendation to the presiding officer of the 
appropriate chamber of the legislature that the legislator be 
censured, suspended, or removed from office.
(D) In the case of a judge, a recommendation to the 
[state court of last resort] and to the presiding officer of 
each chamber of the legislature that the judge be censured, 
suspended, or removed from office-
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(E) An order requiring the public official or public 
employee to conform the official's or employee's conduct to 
the requirements of the Act.
(F) An order requiring the public official or public 
employee to pay a civil penalty of not more than [$2,000] for 
each violation of the Act. The attorney general, when 
requested by the Agency, shall institute proceedings to 
recover a fine or forfeiture incurred under this section not 
paid by, or on behalf of, the person against whom it is 
assessed.
(G) Other recommendations or orders, including:
(i) forfeiture of gifts, receipts or profits 
obtained through a violation of the Act;
(ii) voiding of a state action obtained through 
a violation of the Act; or
(iii) or a combination of the above, as 
necessary and appropriate, consistent with the Act.
(3) A fine imposed by the Agency, disciplinary action 
taken by an appropriate authority, or a determination not to 
take disciplinary action made by an appropriate authority is 
public record.
(4) This section does not limit the power of:
(A) either chamber of the legislature to discipline 
its own members or to impeach a public official; or
(B) of a department to discipline its official or
employees.
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§ 48 Action by the Attorney General
(1) The attorney general may recover a fee, compensation, 
gift, or profit received by a person as a result of a 
violation of the Act.
(2) Action taken by the attorney general under this 
subsection must be brought no later than one (1) year after a 
determination of a violation of the Act
§ 49 Public Inspection of Records
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) below, all 
Agency records are open for public inspection during normal 
business hours.
(2) The following records are not open for public 
inspection:
(A) Records obtained in connection with a request 
for an advisory opinion. The Agency may make records 
described by this subdivision public with the consent of the 
individual whom the records pertain.
(B) Records obtained or prepared by the Agency in 
connection with an investigation or complaint. However, the 
Agency shall permit inspection of the following:
(i) Records made public in the course of a
hearing.
(ii) Verified complaints filed with the Agency.
(iii) Complaints issued by the Agency.
(iv) Probable cause decision with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.
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(v) Decisions with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law issued after a hearing.
(vi) A determination made by the Agency 
regarding a rehearing.
(vii) A settlement entered into by the Agency 
and a respondent.
(3) A person who makes or purports to make public the 
substance or a portion of a confidential advisory opinion 
requested by or on behalf of the person has waived the 
confidentiality of the request for an advisory opinion, and of 
a record obtained by the Agency in connection with the request 
for an advisory opinion.
(4) The agency may publicly respond to a statement or 
interpretation made concerning the contents of an advisory 
opinion or decision it has issued or its purported to have 
issued.
§ 50 Forfeiture of Pension and Retirement Benefits
(1) A public official or public employee, or a survivor, 
heir, successor, or estate of a public official or public 
employee who is convicted of a felony:
(A) relating to; or
(B) arising out of ;
the public official or public employee's public service may 
not receive the portion of pension or retirement benefits paid 
by a public entity and interest accrued on that portion.
(2) A public official or public employee entering a
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public service subsequent to the passage of this Act is deemed 
to have consented to this section as a condition of coverage. 
§ 51 Tax Treatment of Fines and Repayments
(1) A fine, penalty, reimbursement, or other payment 
ordered by the Agency or court in connection with making the 
government whole for a transaction improperly entered into by 
a public official, employee or consultant, or a member of the 
immediate household of a public official, employee, or 
consultant does not qualify for a state or local tax credit or 
deduction.
(2) The guilt or innocence of a party making under 
subsection (1) has no effect upon the state or local tax 
consequences, nor does an admission or failure to admit guilt 
or complicity in a transaction.
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